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Executive Summary 
Background 
This concept paper was commissioned by the Community Driven Development (CDD) unit of 
the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (ESSD) Network of the World 
Bank to the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in early 2003 as an input to a series of regional 
workshops on experiences with CDD approaches in war -torn countries. The paper is based on a 
desk review of available reports mainly from World Bank sources. In addition, the team carried 
out a small questionnaire survey among selected World Bank staff.  
Violent conflict represents not only a significant barrier to development; it also wipes out 
efforts to improve the situation. Experience from many developing countries has shown that 
CDD programmes have been particularly effective in establishing or expanding essential social 
services and physical infrastructure at the local level. However, using CDD approaches in a 
conflict context as a means in post-war rehabilitation represents new challenges. When carried 
out in contexts of past or persistent conflict, CDD projects are confronted with some major 
challenges: 
· communities where projects are set may be deeply divided;  
· power is unequally distributed; 
· lines between combatants and civilians may be blurred; 
· a need to address past traumas may give rise to calls for inquiries or trials; and 
· economic recovery and basic services may be urgently needed.  
 
Nonetheless, the point of departure in this paper is that participatory and demand-led 
development approaches might potentially address three critical concerns in conflict contexts: 
· The need for speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance. 
· The need to improve the state-citizen relationship.  
· The need to create alternative forms of community organisation that foster 
reconciliation between factions of the society.  
 
Outline of paper. The paper is organised in three sections. First, the conceptual framework of 
CDD is presented together with a brief overview of characteristics of conflict contexts. The 
second section is a review of 14 CDD projects carried out in such contexts, assessing their 
relevance and impact. A note should be made, that most of the project documents reviewed are 
planning documents, and hence there was limited information on actual results and impacts. 
The final section contains a summary of main lessons found in the material reviewed, on the 
basis of which questions for further discussion and research are identif ied.   
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Section 1: CDD and conflict contexts 
By combining the principles of popular participation and demand-driven finance, CDD 
approaches seek to place the control of decisions and resources with the beneficiaries. A CDD 
project is successful when it stimulates more development-oriented and inclusive community 
organisation. This paper argues that ideas about ‘community’, ‘social capital’ and 
‘empowerment’ are central in any CDD approach, but in taking these ideas to conflict contexts 
CDD stakeholders are confronted with certain difficult questions:  
· On what basis do communities act collectively in conflict context? What is a 
‘community’ in such circumstances?  
· Social capital is not always for the better, not least in conflict contexts. What kinds of 
social capital should be strengthened? 
· There is no empowerment without disempowerment. What powers should the 
community obtain, and how can such powers be transferred or created in post-conflict 
situations? Who will be losing power in this process? 
 
A key dimension with all three ideas and concepts is the civil society. CDD approaches are 
conditioned by the capacity of civil society organisations to function as interlocutors between 
communities and the state. In conflict contexts, however, civil society in most cases, is not 
readily in a position to play the roles envisaged in CDD, although it often remains strong at a 
local level, both in the parallel economy and in traditional institutions. 
· There is often an extreme process of disengagement of civil society from the state. 
· There has been a fallback on primary groupings within civil society. Kinship, tribal, 
religious and traditional political structures serve as coping strategies for people in 
response to the state’s collapse. 
· Military strategies, extreme scarcity and displacement serve to undermine civil society. 
· Predatory local authorities continue to contest the space occupied by civil society, 
moving into the parallel economy, attempting to create support by drawing on neo-
patrimonial ties based on ethnicity. 
 
Furthermore, when assessing the potentials for CDD approaches in conflict contexts, one must 
not only consider the type of constraints mentioned above. There is also the probability that 
CDD approaches may, if not carefully implemented, further aggravate the situation. Societies 
that have lived through prolonged conflicts are not ‘organisation-free’. The groups that are able 
to articulate their demands to a CDD-type financing mechanism, might be the wrong partners 
for addressing the three needs identified above. 
 
Besides such new sets of issues that CDD stakeholders face they also have to redefine their 
roles vis-à-vis a new set of actors; such as relief agencies and armed groups doing humanitarian 
work.  
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How can CDD projects deal with these challenges? Before reviewing CDD projects, this 
paper suggests aspects of CDD that may constitute operational advantages in conflict contexts. 
· Decentralised flexibility. CDD projects may benefit from a decentralised setup making 
them more flexible and more adaptable to volatile conflict situations and to the fact that 
wars and post-war transitions affect regions differently across the same country.    
· Partnering previous enemies. Community action, a central CDD component, may 
encourage processes than can bridge differences through defining and prioritising 
communal needs. Building trust, in turn, may facilitate reconciliation and the 
integration of refugees, former combatants and internally displaced persons, as well as 
create mechanisms that will mitigate renewed conflict. 
· Promoting local capacity. The CDD emphasis on capacity building, which implies that 
local people are treated as resource persons, may build confidence and a feeling of 
worth and thus have positive psychosocial effects in conflict contexts.   
· Bonding citizens and state. Given its focus on making local and central government 
work together with local communities, CDD has an important potential to improve the 
state-citizen relationship, which may be shattered after violent conflicts.  
 
Section 2: Reviewing CDD in conflict contexts 
This paper reviews 14 CDD projects set in environments marked by conflict. Five are in 
Africa, six in Asia and three in Europe. Seven of the projects have been directly funded by the 
World Bank, six by the Post-Conflict Fund and one  by the UN. The projects focus on 
reconstruction of infrastructure as well as capacity building, cooperation and reconciliation. 
Eight of the projects are ongoing or only very recently terminated.  
 
Organisation: several partners but roles differ   
Three broad sets of organisational arrangements for CDD can be identified, centred on 
partnerships between community-based organisations and (1) local or municipal governments, 
(2) non-governmental organisations or the private sector, and (3) central government or a 
central fund. In the majority of the projects examined, all these stakeholders are involved to 
varying degrees. What distinguishes one project from another is the specific role, in terms of 
responsibilities and authority, the different parties are assigned. 
A major difference discerning the projects from one another is whether traditional institutions 
are used as partners or if new organisations are established. Several of the projects stress the 
establishment of new representative councils to handle the management of projects in a more 
democratic fashion. These projects demand special facilitation and planning. Other projects 
choose to expand already existing traditional institutions, arguing that this would strengthen 
project legitimacy and sustainability.  
In multi-sectoral projects the communities have greater possibility of choice when developing 
project proposals, than in single-sector ones. The ‘open menu’ option also demands more 
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cooperation in the decision-making process, when different projects have to be considered and 
prioritised. One important difference in the projects reviewed concerns the specific power to 
allocate money for project implementation. In some cases this power lies with the 
implementing institution (the NGO or agency), while in other projects this is the responsibility 
of the community committees.  
 
Objectives: only minor adjustments to the conflict context  
Community empowerment is a common denominator for the various CDD projects reviewed. 
Although they all take place in conflict contexts, project objectives do not substantially differ 
from other CDD projects carried out in more stable environments. Still, the special challenges 
of a post-conflict climate are gradually being acknowledged.  
Many projects have involved income generation through microfinance and revolving loans. 
Small loans to finance minor business activities were given, and had to be paid back before 
new loans could be issued. Given the mixed success of this project component it has, in several 
of the projects, been terminated. 
Promoting transparent project management has been an important aim in all of the World 
Bank-sponsored CDD projects. Compared to other organisations, UN and NGOs alike, the 
World Bank seems to have taken more extensive measures to bring corruption issues up for 
broader discussion, introduced measures to prevent corruption and deal with it when/if it 
occurs. 
 
Targeting: balancing capacity, security and need  
The review confirms that the level of organisational capacity within the communities is a key 
factor in determining the scope of the projects. Most projects have formulated specific demands 
concerning communities’ ability and willingness to contribute cash or labour to carry out and 
maintain the sub-projects. A demand-driven approach has its limitations in reaching out to the 
most insecure areas and vulnerable groups. 
The security conditions and remoteness of the areas where many of those who have suffered 
the most live, often do not allow for CDD implementation due to safety concerns on the part of 
the project staff as well as to practical obstacles for CBO formation and resource transfer. Such 
experiences seem to have led to an understanding that CDD projects need to initially prioritise 
conflict resolution as part of the approach. 
Basically CDD is a holistic approach, focusing on the community as a whole. The projects 
have, however, mechanisms that are designed to ensure the participation of vulnerable groups 
in particular and some of the projects include separate sub-components, targeting for instance 
single female household, disabled persons, internally displaced people, or ex-combatants. 
Project experience shows that it is a delicate balance between helping vulnerable groups and 
helping the community as a whole. Unequal distribution may become a source of local 
disputes. 
 
 
  5 
Capacity building and planning: careful preparation is essential 
Several of the project documents underscore the importance of thorough planning and capacity 
building before sub-projects receive funding. If less time is spent on informing the 
communities about the project and their rights and responsibilities, experience shows that 
unwanted side effects like elite capture and corruption are more likely to occur.  
Careful selection of facilitators is vital to the CBO capacity building process. In conflict 
contexts, however, it is not only professional background that will count, but also religious, 
political or ethnic identity and familiarity with the communities concerned.  
In CDD projects, it is common to start out with sma ll grants and gradually increase the amount 
of money to fund local sub-projects. In countries where a functioning bank system is non-
existent, it is vital to have a well-planned system of disbursement, to ensure that the local belief 
in the projects does not fade. 
In order to make sure that local demands are representative for the community as a whole 
participatory methods have proven useful to gain knowledge about specific communities, for 
project planning and for capacity building, especially in communities with a low level of 
literacy. 
 
The role of local and central government 
The CDD approach underlines the importance of partnership between governmental institutions 
and local community. But in conflict contexts, a potential problem for developing such 
partnerships is a low level of institutional capacity, constrained relationship to communities, 
and/or simply inexistence of a government structure. However, since the linkage is deemed 
important, some projects favour strengthening of local government, or inclusion of government 
representatives in the community councils. 
In order to avoid that money is spent on solving issues covered by national or regional 
government plans, it is important that the projects build in mechanisms that ensure flow of 
information between the projects and the local regional authorities and line ministries. If not, 
this will impair communities’ capacity to make informed choices and prioritise wisely. 
Cooperation with local and central governments is also vital to ensure for example, that the 
personnel needed for a new-built hospital or school will in fact be provided by the state.   
Section 3:  
 
Lessons learned  
Conflicts complicate CDD efforts to reach the poorest. The CDD approach has proved 
useful to alleviate poverty. Experience indicates, however, that poor and socially excluded 
groups may face difficulties in responding to the opportunities created by CDD projects, 
particularly in conflict contexts. Addressing the needs of these groups may require even more 
targeted approaches, combined with recognition of the fact that sustainable poverty reduction 
has to be preceded by a certain degree of stability and reconciliation at the community level.  
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CDD does not always reconcile previous enemies. The formation of CBOs and sub-district 
groups do not necessarily foster intra-communal trust and reconciliation in the aftermath of 
conflict. While the establishment of participatory community processes may constitute a useful 
framework for negotiations and dispute mediation, and even contribute to build trust locally, 
community-level reconciliation need to be linked to comparable processes on a national level.  
Prioritise the process, despite urgent post-conflict needs. CDD is dragged in two directions: 
towards facilitating the process of establishing CBOs, and towards giving people immediate 
benefits of peace in the form of access to projects. Yet experience reveals that the process of 
CBO formation emerges as a prerequisite for the success also for shorter-term CDD projects. 
Select the appropriate government agency, even when weak. While some government 
agencies may prove difficult to work with, especially in a conflict context where their role may 
be controversial or their capacities low, to bypass governmental structures or aiming at a 
particularly efficient agency is not a lasting solution. While easing the implementation of CDD 
projects in the short term, the strategy works against the aims of building CDD capacity within 
key ministries and, in the end, ensuring the government’s ownership of and responsibility for 
the CDD process.  
Discuss social capital. CDD aims at rebuilding and strengthening social capital. But if the 
communities, CBOs and facilitators do not define the type of social capital that needs to be 
developed, the causes of the conflict may be left unaddressed and an unjust resource 
distribution maintained. Such a situation may jeopardise the CDD process and regenerate strife.  
Old or new CBOs? A choice that is particularly important when designing projects for conflict 
contexts is whether to build on existing local institutions or to create entirely new ones. 
Building on what exists may enhance the legitimacy of community councils and the returns of 
project investments, although the inclusion and active participation of marginalised groups may 
prove difficult. If traditional power holders are bypassed in an effort to avoid elite capture, 
however, this may also cause societal tension.  
Understand the CBOs. While the impact of the CDD approach is directly related to the 
strengths of the CBOs driving the process, we find few attempts at analysing what incentive 
systems are most effective in fostering CBO performance and accountability.  
Take time. Implementation timetables of CDD projects in conflict-plagued countries have 
often been too ambitious. A main reason is that it has proved difficult to identify motivated and 
skilled local facilitators in countries with a low education level and/or emerging from conflicts 
that have affected the education system.  
Conflicts complicate CDD success. On lessons learned, the paper concludes that the CDD 
approach makes an uneasy fit with situations marked by high inequality, individualised power 
in warlords, landlords or strongmen, or by dangers of elite capture. Such conditions tend to be 
accentuated in contexts of conflict. To make CDD a success in such contexts, therefore, a basic 
requirement is a thorough understanding of the situation on the ground.    
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Questions for further discussion and research 
To enhance the applicability of CDD in areas marked by violent conflict, a range of concerns 
need to be grasped more comprehensively. Starting with the need for speedy reconstruction 
assistance, the following questions should be asked:  
· In a conflict-ridden society, should it be the role of CDD to meet immediate local 
needs? Or should the focus remain on promoting long-term community development 
through participatory processes? 
· If CDD projects do provide assistance to meet the immediate needs of the poorest 
segments of the population, how does that affect the trust building and empowerment of 
the community as a whole? 
· What will be most important for a conflict affected community, to gain trust in their 
government and a peace process, rapid access to humanitarian assistance, or a real sense 
of holding inf luence over development processes? 
 
Second, the need to improve the state-citizen relationship gives rise to questions such as:   
· Should the CDD process be restricted to develop local development capacities or also 
be a tool for the establishment of national governance structures? 
· When the capacity of governmental institutions is seriously impaired by violent conflict 
how can CDD projects best be designed to improve development of knowledge and 
capacities within these institutions? 
· How can the CDD process best be safeguarded against corruption and can micro-
finance projects be developed as an alternative to continued reliance on the illegal 
economy? 
· How should we best differentiate between positive and negative social capital and 
identify ways to promote the  positive one? 
 
Finally, the need to organise communities in ways that foster reconciliation, gives rise to the 
following questions:  
· How can the CDD approach be adapted so that it may help (re)establish local conflict 
resolution mechanisms and national in stitutions?  
· What CBO formation process might best ensure the influence of poor marginalized 
groups and identification of projects that might address the needs of groups victimised 
by wars without alienating the wider population? 
· In divided communities, do the establishment of representative councils and provision 
of finance alone ensure building of trust between conflicting parties? In practice, what 
factors influence the dynamics of council decision-making? 
· Can a linkage be established between CBOs’ ability to freely select their projects and 
their feeling of empowerment? 
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Introduction:  
Reconstruction and reconciliation – what is the scope for 
participatory and demand-led approaches?  
 
1. Generally speaking, popular participation enhances the quality of planned 
development. There are several obvious reasons: needs are better defined, plans are 
informed by local knowledge, decisions have greater legitimacy, people may opt to 
mobilise their own resources, and control and accountability are strengthened. 
Partic ipation, however, can be many different things, ranging from receiving only basic 
information to having the final authority to decide. The concept of Community Driven 
Development (CDD) can be placed at the latter end of this continuum.  
2.  By linking partic ipatory development approaches, of which we have seen many 
varieties over the last several decades, with financing mechanisms that explicitly respond 
to demands, in the form of proposals or applications from local organisations and groups 
– so-called Community Based Organisations (CBOs) – CDD implies placing the control 
of decisions and resources at the level of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, a CDD 
programme is successful when it acts as a stimulus for more development oriented and 
inclusive community organisation. Experience has shown that CDD programmes have 
been particularly effective in establishing or expanding essential social services and 
physical infrastructure at the local level. CDD, of course, is no panacea to development, 
and is only complementary to top-down and supply-driven programmes. 
3.   In this paper1 we shall discuss the scope for using CDD approaches in conflict-ridden 
countries. This involves a range of different situations. Conflict contexts can include 
countries moving from a more stable development situation and into conflict and visa 
versa, and, furthermore, can include countries where only parts of the country are in 
conflict and where negotiations are underway for a peace settlement or a peace agreement 
is being observed. Violent conflict represents not only a significant barrier to 
development; it also wipes out efforts to improve the situation, and therefore affects poor 
countries particularly badly. As stated in a recent World Bank (WB) report (Collier, 
2003), ‘conflict is development in reverse’.  
4.  The World Bank was established in response to post-Second World War challenges, 
and during its first ten years it was mainly engaged in the physical rebuilding of war-torn 
Europe. Since then, post-war reconstruction has been a recurring field in the WB 
                                               
1 This concept paper is the result of work that the Community Driven Development (CDD) unit of the World 
Bank’s Social Development Department commissioned from the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in early 2003. 
The paper will form a basis for a work programme involving a series of regional workshops on CDD in conflict 
and post-conflict environments. In accordance with the Terms of Reference, given in Annex I, the paper (i) 
reviews a sample of CDD approaches used in ‘conflict operations’ and assesses their relevance, impact and the 
main lessons learned; and (ii) highlights the principal thematic areas for future research. This desk study was 
carried out by a core team of three CMI staff, supported by a reference group of other CMI researchers. The core 
team consisted of project leader and political scientist Arne Strand, social anthropologist Hege Toje, and political 
scientist Ingrid Samset. Political scientists Elin Skaar and Astri Suhrke and social anthropologists Alf Morten 
Jerve and Eyolf Jul-Larsen constituted the reference group. Jerve participated in completing the final draft. 
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portfolio. In 1995-96 the Bank established a Post-Conflict Unit, now the Conflict 
Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPRU), and later in 1997 a separate Post-Conflict 
Fund (PCF) was founded. A World Bank report on post-conflict reconstruc tion activity 
within the World Bank (Holtzman 1998) underscores the fact that the Bank’s mandate 
authorises an involvement in financing and facilitating reconstruction and development in 
its member countries. The WB mandate does not allow the institution to take charge of 
peacemaking or peacekeeping, and the Bank is not a relief agency. It is within these 
guidelines that the Bank’s future role in post-war reconstruction will evolve. The Bank 
has acknowledged that conflicts represent a particular challenge for its work, and that 
more systematic knowledge needs to be generated on how projects, including those 
within the CDD framework, can best be implemented in war-affected environments 
(Kreimer, 1998). 
5.  The end of the Cold War led to a change in conflict patterns. In today’s wars, the lines 
between combatants and civilians are increasingly blurred. In post-conflict ‘complex 
political emergencies’ and ‘failed states’, there are complex social and political 
challenges to be overcome besides economic recovery. A need to address the traumas of 
the past may give rise to calls for inquiries or trials. The aftermath of war also involves a 
variety of humanitarian actors, including military groups doing humanitarian work. 
Finally, causes and consequences of the hostilities will vary broadly from country to 
country. The context of past or persistent conflict, therefore, poses a range of challenges 
to stakeholders in CDD projects. 
6.  Our point of departure in this paper is that participatory and demand-led development 
approaches might potentially address three critical concerns in conflict contexts: 
 The need for speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance. 
The need to improve the state -citizen relationship. 
The need to create alternative forms of community organisation that foster 
reconciliation between factions of the society. 
7.  For obvious reasons, working with the state or ‘the people’ in conflict contexts is not 
the same as doing so under stable conditions. Some of the major hindrances are:   
· Security being a critical concern. 
· A prevailing lack of trust between communities and towards governmental 
structures and officials. 
· Weakened or contested governmental structures. 
· Erosion of social capital. 
· A war economy operating in parallel to the legal financial system. 
 
8. Furthermore, the civil society might not be in a position to respond constructively to 
calls for partnership under a CDD framework. Community Based Organisations are the 
cornerstone of any CDD project and form the crucial link between the state (or any other 
financing institution) and the beneficiaries. In a study of how conflicts affect civil society, 
Harvey (1998: 206-207) identifies five interlinked processes that, undoubtedly, might  
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influence a CDD approach to reconstruction and reconciliation: 
· An extreme process of disengagement of civil society from the state. 
· A fallback on primary groupings within civil society. Kinship, tribal, religious 
and traditional political structures serve as coping strategies for people in 
response to the state’s collapse. 
· Military strategies, extreme scarcity and displacement serve to undermine civil 
society. 
· Predatory local authorities continue to contest the space occupied by civil 
society, moving into the parallel economy and attempting to create support by 
drawing on neo-patrimonial ties based on ethnicity.  
· Civil society remains strong at a local level, both in the parallel economy and in 
traditional institutions. 
9. Not only are CDD approaches in conflict contexts constrained by the factors 
mentioned above, there is also the probability that they may further aggravate the 
situation. As stated in Harvey’s last point, societies that have lived through prolonged 
conflicts are not ‘organisation-free’, but the groups that are able to articulate their 
demands to a CDD-type financing mechanism might be the wrong kind of partners for 
addressing the three needs identified above. 
10.   There is no simple answer on how to deal with these challenges, no ‘one size fits all’. 
The situations in which the World Bank operates differ considerably. Although the core 
element of a CDD project is some form of demand-responsive financing mechanism, one 
should avoid therefore presenting CDD as an instrument, in the sense of ready-made 
programme designs. Rather, it represents a way of thinking - an approach to development. 
The aim of this paper is to identify some of the experience with this approach in twelve 
post-conflict countries as a basis for discussing potentials and risks.  
11.  The paper is organised in three sections. The first section gives the reader an 
overview of the main elements of the CDD approach – conceptually and in practice. In 
section two we present our findings from a review of fourteen CDD projects, largely WB 
funded. The last section draws on the general findings from this review and articulates 
crit ical issues for further discussion and research.  
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Section 1:  
What characterises CDD and contexts of conflict?  
CDD at a glance 
Ends and means 
12.   Bottom-up approach. According to the World Bank, CDD represents a bottom-up 
approach to development and poverty reduction, based on the participation and 
empowerment of economically poor people. CDD seeks to empower local 
communities by handing over control over decisions and resources to accountable, 
inclusive community groups. CDD also aims at strengthening the relationships between 
such communities and local government, non-governmental organisations and central 
government through partnerships. CDD is viewed as a means to achieve a broad and 
comprehensive development agenda, including the provision of infrastructure services, 
the organisation of economic activity and resource management, the empowerment of the 
poor, the improvement of governance and the enhancement of the security of the poorest 
(Dongier et.al. 2002). 
13.   Previously, community stakeholders took part in projects conducted or funded by the 
World Bank only to a limited extent. Between 1994 and 1998, however, community 
participation as an element in Bank-assisted projects significantly increased (Van 
Wicklin, 2001). The principle of participation gained ground as it was realised that the 
structural adjustment programmes and ‘market-led development’ of the 1980s had failed 
to reach the poorest segments of the population (Craig and Mayo, 1995). As opposed to 
previous approaches, the far more participatory CDD approach has proved more 
effective in terms of reaching the poor. It also appears more cost-effective and 
sustainable. 
14.  Handling diversity. The decentralised design of CDD provides the potential to shape 
the project in accordance with the concrete regional and community needs and challenges 
in development in conflict contexts. Conflict often affects regions differently, and the 
transition to peace may take a different pace and directions across a country. If the CDD 
project is designed in a flexible manner, the concrete challenges that different 
communities experience may thus be addressed successfully. 
15.  The CDD approach to community participation is centred on the ‘community-based 
organisation’ (CBOs), the actor to which control of decisions and resources is normally 
handed over. Ideally, the CBOs are representative of their community and work in 
partnership with demand-responsive support organisations and service providers, 
including elected local governments, the private sector, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), and central government agencies. Box 1 elaborates on the defining 
characteristics of CBOs. 
16.  Rebuilding community trust. Obstacles to development in conflict contexts include 
the depletion of human capital and the destruction of the social fabric and trust within the 
community, which consequently impair the ability to act collectively. The stress within 
CDD on community action and capacity building encourages processes where internal 
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differences and mistrust can be bridged through defining and prioritising communal 
needs. Community decision-making, project planning and implementation thus have a 
potential not only to meet the needs of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure, but 
also to start a process where social capital can be reconstructed. 
17.  Increasing awareness of local capabilities. A focus on community can create greater 
awareness of local capacities and facilitate processes where local knowledge and skills 
can be used to promote development and change. Treating local people as resource 
persons builds confidence and a feeling of worth, and may have positive psychosocial 
effects in conflict contexts.   
 
Box 1. Defining Characteristics of Community-Based Organisations  
A community-based organisation 
- Is a membership organisation of individuals in a self-defined community who have joined together to 
further common interests; 
- Often consists of people that live near one another in a neighbourhood or in a village; 
- May consist of people united by a common interest related to production, consumption, common 
pool resources, or service delivery; 
- Is informal or formal; 
- Differs from NGOs by furthering the interests of their members, whereas NGOs may pursue 
commitments that do not directly benefit their members; and 
- Differs from local governments by being voluntary and choosing its own objectives. 
 Source: Dongier et.al. 2002. 
 
18.  An enabling environment. Even though the CDD approach is rooted in the local 
community, it goes beyond the local sphere by focusing on how relations between the 
community, its surroundings and governmental structures can be improved. Beyond the 
strengthening and financing of CBOs, support to CDD thus usually includes the 
facilitation of community access to information through a variety of media; the forging of 
links between CBOs and formal institutions; and the promotion of appropriate policy and 
institutional reform. CDD projects are considered most successfully implemented if the 
government of the state has a functional decentralisation policy. In the absence of a 
central commitment to decentralisation, the projects themselves are seen as instrumental 
to the promotion of decentralisation.  
19.  State-citizen relationship. Conflicts erode governmental institutions, and often leave 
a legacy of distrust in the relationship between the government and communities. If the 
governmental institutions are seriously affected and weak it is likely that the 
strengthening of local governments will be moved down their list of priorities. A state’s 
basic service provision is also unlikely to work in a satisfying way, which may further 
erode the relation between citizens and state and fuel renewed conflict. In a transition 
between war and peace CDD offers a way to mitigate this effect as it can enhance the 
communication and institutional links between central government and rural areas that 
may not be so easily accessed. Operating in the intersection between communities and 
government, CDD seeks to foster a mutually reinforcing process between community 
development and local government development which, through scaling up, will exert 
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influence at national level (WBI, 2000). In addition, if successfully implemented the 
projects can strengthen trust and belief in the new government by the local communities, 
in the event that they experience an improvement in their lifestyle. 
20.  Building social capital and strengthening political influence. It is also suggested 
by the WB that allowing communities to have control over decisions and resources could 
enable them to build social capital by ‘expanding the depth and range of their networks’.  
Furthermore, a strengthening of inclusive local associations might increase poor people’s 
voice in local political processes and governance (Dongier et al. 2002: 308). 
21.  Impact in conflict contexts. CDD projects generally have two kinds of output 
targets: (a) to meet the basic needs of the community, and (b) to promote social change 
through the establishment of viable and representative community organisations. An 
important assumption underpinning this approach in a post-conflict environment is the 
contribution to greater social cohesion and mutual trust. It is assumed, therefore, that a 
CDD project may facilitate reconciliation and the integration of refugees, former 
combatants and internally displaced persons, as well as create mechanisms that will work 
against renewed conflict.  
 
Three basic concepts: do not romanticise what is local  
22.  In our review of CDD documentation, we found frequent use of rather abstract social 
science concepts. There is an obvious danger that such a vocabulary may blur rather than 
clarify the notion of CDD. We note that three of the most central concepts used – 
‘community’, ‘social capital’, and ‘empowerment’ – were either inadequately defined or 
not defined at all. The lack of an explicit understanding of the terms used to justify and 
build projects is unfortunate, since such a lack may cause misunderstanding between the 
various CDD stakeholders. We need to ask basic questions, such as: 
· How does one recognise a ‘community’? On what basis do communities act 
collectively? 
· Is social capital always constructive? What kind of social capital should be 
strengthened? 
· What powers should the community obtain, and how should such powers be 
transferred or created? Who will be losing power in this process? 
‘Community’ 
23.  The ‘community’ is seen as a driving force of development, and encompasses a 
variety of social processes and organisations – including symbols, ideas, values and 
ideologies (Cohen, 1985). ‘Community’ refers to ‘collectivity’ or ‘social unit’, as well as 
to ‘forms of social bonds or sentiments’. The term is at the same time empirically 
descriptive and normatively prescriptive (Minar and Greer, 1970). It is this latter, 
normative aspect that gives the ‘community’ concept its clout, since it refers to widely 
acclaimed aspects of social life such as unity, solidarity, mutual help and constructive 
collective action. This normative and positive interpretation of ‘community’, however, 
ignores the fact that disputes, rivalry and conflict also constitute a daily part of communal 
life.  
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24.  Given this variety of possible interpretations, it is vital that designers of projects that 
are to be ‘community driven’ articulate an understanding of the ‘community’ that is 
supposed to ‘drive’ the development. Such an understanding should, in particular, attempt 
to take note of the local understandings of ‘community’, which will depend on the socio-
cultural setting and specific local traditions and histories.  
25.  Another important issue concerning the concept of community driven development is 
the question of what conditions a community needs to be able to drive development in a 
sustainable way. What mechanisms should governments institutionalise to create enabling 
conditions? Popular participation in planning and implementation has been attempted in 
various ways for decades. While most of these approaches tended to be heavily guided or 
simply steered from central levels, the CDD approach implies mechanisms that leave 
greater space for independent decision-making at local level. The term ‘demand-driven’ 
is central. While mechanisms such as block grants and funding based on applications 
provide a greater scope for local empowerment, there are also obvious problems 
associated with sustainable management of the assets and services being created. What 
should be the role of the community versus (local) government in rebuilding essential 
public services? Finding the appropriate mix of demand- and supply-driven approaches in 
a given context and for specific purposes is a challenge that has to be approached 
carefully.  
‘Social capital’ 
26.  The CDD approach aims at building forms of social capital that enhance the local 
capacity for cooperation, in order to address common needs and stimulate economic 
development. Dongier et al. (2002: 308) in their presentation of CDD define social capital 
as ‘…the ability of individuals to secure benefits as a result of membership in social 
networks.’ But what, exactly, is this ‘social capital’ that CDD aims at building? 
27.  ‘Social capital’2 may be regarded as complementary to and partly overlapping with 
‘community’. Whereas community often refers to a social unit, social capital is tied to the 
dynamics and quality of relationships within and outside that unit. It refers to the social 
and cultural coherence of society, and the values and norms that govern interactions 
among people and the institutions in which they are embedded (Feldman and Assaf, 
1999). Scholars have approached the question of societal coherence in various ways, and 
social capital is defined differently by different scholars. For instance, Pierre Bourdieu 
views social capital as resource - a form of relational power - relationships tied to specific 
persons that are useful in political, economical or cultural terms (Bourdieu, 1986). 
Whereas Bourdieu views capital as unequally distributed in society, scholars such as 
Robert D. Putnam identify social capital in a more depersonalized fashion as features of 
social organization, and vital assets in institutional and economic development (Putnam, 
1993). 
                                               
2 For an overview of various uses of the concept, see Feelman and Assaf (1999) Social Capital: Conceptual 
Framework and Empirical Evidence: An Annotated Bibliography. The World Bank, Social Capital Working Paper 
Series, New York. 
(http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Networks/ESSD/icdb.nsf/D4856F112E805DF4852566C9007C27A6/3DF57CBA
9DF066B7852569FF0065AD74/$FILE/SCI-WPS -05.pdf)   
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28.  Within the notion of social capital some scholars choose to distinguish between weak 
and strong social ties or relationships. Strong ties refer to the close relationships between 
family members and neighbours, often based on kinship, ethnicity and religion, which 
may work as a safety net for survival. Weak ties are relationships that connect people to 
outside communities, and thus may bridge differences in kinship, religion and ethnicity. 
Social capital has been further refined through a differentiation between ‘horizontal’ and 
‘vertical’ social capital.  ‘Horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ social capital includes both weak and 
strong ties. Horizontal social capital refers to social networks, norms and trust that 
facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit. Vertical social capital, on the other hand, 
conceptualises the hierarchical relationship between communities and individuals on the 
one hand, and state institutions, the legal environment and the market on the other 
(Colletta and Cullen, 2000).  
29.  How then does conflict affect social capital? It is widely acknowledged that conflict 
and a lack of economic and social security cause deterioration in the quality of trust in 
social relations and a tendency to reinforce political and ethnic divisions. Coletta and 
Cullen (ibid. 3-4) point out that violent conflict ‘…divides the population by undermining 
interpersonal and communal trust, destroying the norms and values that underlie 
cooperation and collective action for the common good, and increases the likelihood of 
communal strife.’ Such damage to the nation’s social capital, they argue, ‘…impedes the 
ability of either communal groups or the state to recover after hostilities cease.’ They 
conclude that even if other forms of capital are replenished ‘…economic and social 
development will be hindered unless social capital stocks are restored.’ 
30.  Within CDD projects, as was the case for ‘community’, ‘social capital’ tends to be 
viewed as fundamentally constructive. In reality, however, ‘social capital’ is a resource 
that can be used for both productive and destructive purposes. Social capital may, for 
instance, constitute a key asset in practices of corruption and in violent conflicts. A 
question that must be asked is, therefore: what kind of social capital needs to be 
reconstructed after war? 
‘Empowerment’ 
31.  A pronounced objective within CDD is ‘community empowerment’. But what does 
‘empowerment’ mean? How do CDD projects relate to community empowerment? And 
what challenges does a context of conflict pose to achieving this aim? 
One World Bank document defines ‘empowerment’ as ‘the enhancement of assets and 
capabilities of diverse individuals and groups, so that they can engage, influence and hold 
accountable the institutions that affect their well-being’ (Matzen, 2002). Four central 
elements in empowerment are highlighted: information, inclusion/participation, 
accountability and local organizational capacities.3 CDDs aim to ensure such 
empowerment through the allocation of untied funds to communities, which may allow 
them to prioritise and manage their own projects. Box 2 reflects the Bank’s view on how, 
according to the Bank, communities can most efficiently be empowered to control their 
own affairs.  
                                               
3 Source: The website ‘Four elements of empowerment’ 
(http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/empowerment/whatis/elements.htm)  
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Box 2. Empowering Communities: Guiding Principles 
1. Develop local skills through learning by doing; 
2. Start with small grants and grow gradually; 
3. Aim at covering communities across entire countries;  
4. Safeguard against social exclusion and elite capture; 
5. Ensure that the direction of accountability is downward towards local people; 
6. Transfer responsibility for tasks to the lowest level of government; 
7. ‘Decentralise’ by cooperating between different levels of government; 
8. Give a transparent share of resources to local governments; 
9. Ensure ‘ownership’ by making sure that communities and local governments contribute to costs; 
10. Let existing community-level institutions tailor the CDD projects; and 
11. Include mechanisms to ensure that non-prioritised objectives are not undermined. 
Source: World Bank Institute, 2000 
 
32.  The core element of the concept of ‘empowerment’ is power. This analytical concept 
is complex and scientifically contested. Power is generally understood to be concerned 
with bringing about consequences. Some social scientists emphasize the different bases 
of power (for ins tance, wealth, status, knowledge, force, charisma, authority), while 
others stress the different forms of power (such as influence, coercion and control) or the 
different uses of power (such as individual or community ends, economic or political 
ends)(Kuper and Kuper, 1985). An important question, therefore, is what kinds of power 
the community should obtain, and how such powers should be transferred or created.  
33.  Based on what the World Bank defines as empowerment, it is possible to assert that 
CDD projects seek simultaneously to generate power in terms of knowledge and 
information, and to transfer power (from the state to the communities) in terms of control 
over resources and decision-making in issues that concern them the most. Empowerment 
thus implies redistributing power and transforming institutions, as part of a bottom-up 
democratization process. Empowerment in general and the community empowerment 
agenda of CDD projects in particular both deserve careful consideration, as they imply 
that an external actor with economic power may use that power to change power relations 
within the society where this actor disburses its funds. The question is, however, whether 
there can be a successful process of empowerment without changes in power structures 
both at local, and broader national and even international, levels (Allen, 2000).  
34.  Empowering communities in contexts of conflict. Empowering communities ‘as a 
whole’ may, moreover, be particularly difficult in areas affected by armed conflict. War 
tends to shift power relations within society, often in the direction of greater inequality, 
since the conflict situation favours those with weapons, who will use their military power 
to enhance their economic and political position. As a result, a post-war context is often 
marked by heavy imbalances and by rifts that may divide communities themselves. When 
untied funds are disbursed to communities emerging from war, it may therefore be 
difficult to ensure that the resources reach the community ‘as a whole’, since resource 
access to some extent may have been monopolised by smaller sections of the community. 
The experiences of Afghanistan and Rwanda, for instance, demonstrate that a major 
challenge in post-war contexts is to ensure that projects will not only benefit the victors of 
  17 
war or those who still have access to military power, but also those who ended up on the 
losing side of the conflict, or who were impoverished or exploited as a result of it. The 
breakdown of institutions and transformation of social capital paradoxically also harbour 
important potential for change in power relations, and a significant task of reconstruction 
is to bring about change in the relationships and factors that once caused war. 
35.  From this discussion several fundamental questions arise: How will the process of 
empowerment through the transfer and creation of powers interact with the existing 
distribution of power in the community? How will this influence the relationship between 
local government and the community? Are CDD projects enough to bring about an all 
encompassing change in power relations at different levels? 
 
Who are the primary CDD stakeholders? 
36.  At the core of a CDD project is the bilateral relationship between (a) a demand-
responsive institution as the provider of financial and material support and (b) a local 
organisation capable of articulating its demand and making use of the support. However, 
there are few instances, not least in conflict contexts, where the intervention can be 
limited to only these two types of stakeholder. To make this basic relationship work, there 
is a need to influence the wider institutional environment. We can distinguish between 
eight types of stakeholder that independently may influence the outcome of a CDD 
project: 
1) People living in the community. Ideally speaking it is their needs and 
involvement that is to inform and guide the interventions of all other stakeholders. 
However, as argued above, it may not be self-evident who these people are. There 
may be a conflict between the notion of a self-defined community and concern for 
inclusiveness.  
2) The community based organisations . The CBOs are responsible for selecting, 
implementing, monitoring and sustaining the CDD projects. While most CDD 
projects involve a wide range of development actors, the single most important 
partner in CDD remains the CBOs. These are sometimes formed especially for the 
project through local elections with the assistance of CDD facilitators. The CBO 
may also emerge from already existing social institutions. In the latter case, there 
is a pressure to ensure that vulnerable groups are included, such as women and 
poor people, who traditionally may have had little or no influence on communal 
decision-making.  
3) The non-governmental organisations . The Bank collaborates with NGOs in 
three ways within the CDD framework: (1) for facilitation of capacity building of 
the CBOs, (2) in situations where local government has been weak or contested, 
and (3) for purposes of monitoring and evaluating CDD projects. 
4) The facilitators. Most CDD projects have recruited people to work as social 
mobilisers or change agents in the target communities. Their role is to facilitate 
the formation of CBOs, assist them in undertaking needs assessments, and provide 
them with the necessary skills and attitudes to manage and sustain the 
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development process. Facilitators involved in CDD projects include people locally 
employed and trained, local government officials, consultants and NGO staff. 
5) The central government. CDD projects are often coordinated from an 
autonomous unit within a government department, or as a central fund operating 
independently, paralleling the governmental structure.  The inclusion of 
government representatives is, however, not always plain sailing. Firstly, the 
central government of a country may show little willingness to agree on the 
degree of decentralisation that the CDD approach requires. Secondly, the selection 
of local and national government partners may be difficult, as the government 
structure may be opaque, and representatives with the needed skills may not 
always be available. Thirdly, there may be a lack of trust between the government 
and the local communities; as a result, WB staff and facilitators risk being judged 
with suspicion if seen as being too close to either the community or the 
government. 
6) The local governments. Involvement of the local government is essential. 
Several CDD projects (e.g. Social Funds) have been criticised for bypassing, and 
thereby undermining, this level of government. Albeit often weak, local 
governments have the responsibility for overall planning and coordination, and 
they may assist communities in developing project proposals and function as 
technical advisers. In many instances capacity building is called for. 
7) International organisations . In countries emerging from conflict, a multitude of 
international organisations are normally present. UN agencies, for instance, may 
be engaged in peace-building, governance and the provision of humanitarian and 
development assistance; other organisations may be involved in areas where CDD 
projects are also implemented. Even though these organisations are rarely directly 
involved in CDD projects, their role matters inasmuch as they may influence, 
collaborate with or overlap with CDD initiatives.  
8) The World Bank , as the main financing agency, has been playing a very active 
role in most of its CDD projects, spurred not least by their innovativeness. WB 
staff has been very influential in the design process and the follow-up research.  
Characteristics of contexts of conflict 
37.  Most of the CDD projects reviewed in this report have taken place under conditions 
of armed conflict, or in their aftermath. What are the main characteristics of such conflict 
or post-conflict contexts? In the following we will introduce key factors that need to be 
considered seriously when designing and implementing CDD projects in conflict-ridden 
settings.  
38.  The general picture. In countries experiencing armed conflict or emerging from 
such, there is severe destruction of the physical infrastructure, with landmines and 
unexploded ordnance posing a security risk. Governments may be short of the necessary 
human and financial resources, and people have little funding of their own to rebuild or 
develop their communities and businesses. People often lack trust in government 
agencies, communities are divided, and unrepresentative individuals may retain a 
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coercion-backed influence over decision-making. Nevertheless, post-conflict situations 
may also bring with them opportunities for positive changes and a ‘new start’. 
39.  The role of the government. There are very large variations as for types of 
government and administration established in conflict contexts. Many might have a long 
way to go before being accepted by the majority of the population or being able to 
establish a well functioning administration, although, at the same time, the expectations 
within the population might be very high. If the government has limited financial 
resources or is politically immature (or military influenced) , donors and external forces 
might hold undue influence over the economic and political processes. A government’s 
inability to improve peoples living conditions, protection of their citizens against abuses 
and willingness to take political processes further might then very easily spark new 
rounds of violence, not least as there might be influential individuals and groups that have 
more to gain from a continued instability.  
40.  Varying conflict causes. Causes of conflict vary considerably, may change over time 
and differ from the official explanat ions. While underlying causes may relate to 
underdevelopment and resource competition, hostilities may be officially explained as 
being based on ideological, ethnic and religious differences, abuses of power and 
position, terrorism or human rights abuses. A thorough understanding of the causes of the 
conflict is hence essential when planning for CDD projects, to find ways to strengthen 
elements positive to development and ensure that the assistance at least ‘do no harm’ 
(Anderson, 1999). 
41.  Poverty. Arguably, there are two aspects of poverty that needs to be taken into 
consideration in conflict contexts. A high number of people are poor as they end up as 
victims of conflicts, having their property and income sources destroyed, as agriculture or 
smaller businesses, or having to leave these and their belongings behind when migrating. 
Moreover, large scale destruction, presence of mines and UXOs, a high number of people 
killed or injured and other results of violent conflict will certainly hamper people’s ability 
to overcome poverty, and making them more vulnerable to both economic hardship and 
natural disasters.  
42.  Violations of rights. Human rights and property rights are normally severely violated 
during war and armed conflict, with women and children becoming especially vulnerable.  
Re-establishing respect for such rights and enabling a reconciliation process to begin is 
thus a major challenge, in particular if the post-conflict government includes former 
military groups and leaders. 
43.  Gender roles. Conflicts tend to change traditional gender roles. On the one hand 
societies tend become more conservative and protective of women, often caused by 
increasing threats to their security and increase in rape and abduction cases, leading to 
restrictions on their movements and public job opportunities. While on the other hand the 
absence of men in many families, cause by enrolment in military units or (forced) work 
migration, might alter the traditional gender roles, forcing women to assume a larger 
responsibility for their families and generally within society.  
44.  Psycho-social effects. While physical destruction is easily identified the psycho-
social effects of a conflict might be more long-lasting and difficult to map. Systematic 
oppression and the use of torture and rape, children seeing family members killed and 
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people having to live with fear over a number of years – these influence both individuals 
and communities. 
45.  Migration.  Conflicts often create large-scale migration, as people flee the fighting or 
seek new income opportunities elsewhere. People with higher education are often the first 
to leave. In the aftermath of war, internally displaced people or refugees may be cautious 
about a quick return. Many families and networks will rather try to establish a security net 
by only sending some members back first to prepare the ground for the others. 
46.  A fragile security situation and continuing violence. Even if an armed conflict 
formally comes to an end, violence may continue on a lower or more localised level. Such 
low-intensity conflict will not only be disruptive for project implementation but might 
influence communities’ ability and willingness to engage in their own recovery processes. 
The success of demobilisation processes and the degree to which traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms are intact might impact significantly on the conflict level. 
47.  Influence of a war economy. Throughout a conflict the different ‘conflict 
entrepreneurs’ often find different means of funding and sustaining their military and 
political engagement. Some of these are likely to be illegal, such as the sale of weapons, 
trafficking in drugs and people, the extortion of natural resources and the ‘taxation’ of 
traders and common people; there will be a reluctance to end such activities or hand 
control of resources over to a legitimate government. Local communities might here be 
sharply divided between those wishing to end illegal practices and leave financial 
resources and authority to the state, and those favouring continuing illegal practices for 
their own financial benefits or due to pressure from conflict entrepreneurs. 
48.  Pre- and post-conflict: similarity and divergence. A country that emerges from a 
war may have been at a low level of development before the strife occurred, and have had 
a weak governmental structure. Communities that CDD projects face in conflict contexts 
may therefore have a long history of self-reliance and management – although the conflict 
may have weakened community bonds and structures.  
Even though the country contexts of the projects reviewed in this report share 
characteristics of a conflict or post-conflict environment, they also involve specific 
challenges related to the local and regional course of events. Table 1 illustrates this 
diversity of national contexts, and lists the main challenges faced in each context. It 
shows that the project framework has in some cases involved conflicts of varying 
intensity, limited to certain regions (Indonesia, Uganda, the Philippines and Georgia), and 
in others persistent and intensive conflicts with a country-wide scope (Angola, Burundi, 
Rwanda, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina).  
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Table 1. Country Contexts of Reviewed CDD projects: Financial Costs and Sectors 4 
Country Conflict 
Context 
Projects  Total project cost  Sub- Sector R/U5  
Afghanistan Internal and 
external 
conflicts 
National Community 
Empowerment Programme 
42 mill US$  Community Action Program 
Irrigation & Drainage 
Rural Roads 
Other Transportation 
R 
  The P.E.A.C.E Programme Annually 20 mill 
US$  
Community action 
Agriculture 
Social services 
R/U 
Angola Civil war Social Action Project (FAS) (I-
III) 
I: 24 mill US$  
II: 47 mill US$  
III: 120 mill US$ 
Social Funds 
Social Assistance 
 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Civil war Building Local Institutions and 
Social Capital: the Tuzla Model 
135  375 US$  Economic recovery / Private Sector 
R 
Burundi Civil war Social Action Pro ject (I-II) I: 10, 4 mill US$  
II: 13,6 mill US$ 
Central government administration  
General education sector 
Other social services 
Roads and highways 
Water supply  
  Community Rehabilitation 
Project  
2 mill US$  IDP/Resettlement/Refugee support  
R 
East Timor War against 
Indonesian 
occupation 
Community Empowerment and 
Local Governance Project  
I: 21 mill US$  
II: 8,5 mill US$  
II: 1,5 mill US$  
General public administration sector 
Media 
Other social services 
Roads and highways 
General water, sanitation and flood 
protection sector 
R 
Georgia War against 
Abkhazia 
Self Reliance for IDPs and Host 
Families in Samagrelo region 
1, 333 201 US$  IDP /Resettlement/ Refugee support  R 
Indonesia Transition to 
democracy, 
regional 
conflicts 
Kecamatan Development Project 
(I-III) 
I: 273 mill US$  
II: 421,5 mill US$ 
III: 376,8 mill 
US$  
Irrigation and drainage 
Sub-national government 
administration 
Primary education 
Roads and highways 
Water supply  
R 
Kosovo Civil War Kosovo Community 
Development Fund 
10, 32 mill US$  Social Funds R/U 
Philippines 
 
Regional 
conflict  
Promoting Transition from 
Conflict to Peace and 
Development at Community 
Level in Mindanao 
950  000 US$  IDP /Resettlement/ Refugee support  R/U 
Rwanda 
 
Civil war  Community Reintegration and 
Development Project  
5,2 mill US$  Social Protection Adjustment R 
Serbia Civil War Southern Serbia Municipal 
Improvement and Recovery 
Programme  
1 mill US$  IDP /Resettlement/ Refugee support  U 
Somalia Civil war Health Service Recovery Project  1 mill  US$  Health  R 
Sources: Project information documents, and information given in questionnaire.  
                                               
4 Note. Under ‘Context’ only the most general features of the conflicts are pointed out, and details on the 
sequencing and course of each conflict are not accounted for. 
5 R= rural, U= Urban 
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Section 2:  
A review of fourteen CDD projects 
Methodology 
49.  Selection of projects . The concept paper is based on a review of altogether fourteen 
CDD or community empowerment projects. The projects were selected based on an 
overview provided by the World Bank. In addition we searched the Internet for projects 
with ‘community driven development’ or ‘community empowerment’ as keywords. The 
search led us mostly to the World Bank’s own Web Pages, which is the main reason why 
all of the selected projects except one are in some way linked to the Bank. 6 The majority 
of these selected projects may be grouped into two categories: (1) projects where the 
World Bank, most frequently in close cooperation with national government, financed 
CDD projects through loans,7 and (2) CDD projects implemented by NGOs or 
international humanitarian organisations partly or fully financed by grants from the Post-
Conflict Fund (PCF).8 In projects of the first category the World Bank influence is more 
significant. 
50.  Five of the projects took place in Africa, six in Asia, and three in Europe. Seven of 
the projects were funded by the World Bank, six by the PCF, and one by the UN. All 
projects were oriented towards community empowerment and implemented in countries 
which were either recovering from conflict or experiencing renewed conflict. The World 
Bank project in Afghanistan and the Support for Conflict-Ridden Areas Project (SCRAP) 
in Indonesia were in the starting-up phase and reports on implementation were therefore 
not available. It is included, however, to compare how the different projects are designed 
and to judge whether the special challenges found in the aftermath of the conflict 
influenced the development of the project. Table 2 provide further details on the projects 
reviewed.  
 
 
                                               
6 See appendix IV for an overview of people and organisations contacted. 
7 In the case of the Social Action Project in Burundi, financial support was granted to a national NGO. 
8 The Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) was established in 1997 to enhance the Bank’s ability to support physical and 
social reconstruction in post-war societies.  In contrast to the loan and credit system that the Bank most often 
operates through, the PCF grants are available to a wider range of recipient and implementing agencies. The PCF 
supports planning, piloting and analysis of ground-breaking activities through the funding of various partners 
(institutions, non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies, transitional authorities, governments, and 
other civil society institutions). The projects are often designed to provide a basis for future Bank Programmes and 
projects on a  larger scale. 
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Table 2. Reviewed CDD Projects In Conflict Settings  
Sponsor Area Country Name of Project Implementing Agency Start End 
Angola Social Action Project (I-III)   Ministry of Planning/ 
FAS   
1995 2008 
Burundi Social Action Project (I-II) Twitezimbere  1997 2005 
Africa 
Rwanda Community Reintegration 
and Development Project  
Ministry of Local 
Government  
1999 2003 
Afghanistan  National Community 
Empowerment Programme 
 
Afghanistan Assistance 
Coordination Authority 
and the Ministries of 
Interior, of Rural 
Reconstruction and 
Development, of Public 
Works, and of Irrigation 
2002 2004 
East Timor Community Empowerment 
and Local Governance 
Project 
UNTAET Department of 
District Administration 
2000 2003 
Asia 
Indonesia Kecamatan Development 
Project (I-III) 
Ministry of Home Affairs  1998 2008 
The 
World 
Bank 
Europe Kosovo Kosovo Community 
Development Fund 
Community Development 
Fund 
2001 2003 
Burundi Community Rehabilitation 
Project 
Burundi/ UNHCR 1999 2002 Africa 
Somalia Health Service Recovery 
Project 
International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies  
2000 NA10 
Georgia Self Reliance for IDPs and 
Host Families in Samagrelo 
region 
Acción contra el Hambre  2002 Dec. 
2002 
Asia 
Philippines  
 
Promoting Transition from 
Conflict to Peace and 
Development at Community 
Level in Mindanao 
Community and Family 
Services International 
2001 2003 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Building Local Institutions 
and Social Capital: the 
Tuzla Model 
Friends of Bosnia  2002 NA 
The Post-
Conflict 
Fund 
Europe 
Serbia Southern Serbia Municipal 
Improvement and Recovery 
Program 
UNDP/ Government of 
Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 
2001 NA 
  The UN Asia Afghanistan The P.E.A.C.E Programme  UNDP, FAO, UNCHS 
(Habitat), and OPS  
1997 2001 
                                               
10 NA= Not available 
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51.  Procedures and difficulties in data collection. The data collection for the paper has 
been conducted by means of the following methods: (1) a search of key documents, 
including policy papers, source books, project appraisals, project information documents, 
evaluation reports, working papers, and discussion papers; (2) the use of a questionnaire 
distributed to key WB and project staff; and (3) telephone interviews. The questionnaire 
was distributed to 22 different organisations and persons, out of which 8 found the time to 
participate (see appendix II for questionnaire). Further, we consulted the literature on 
rehabilitation and development efforts in conflicts, on participatory processes, on peace-
building and on experiences from other conflicts and humanitarian interventions. A main 
difficulty faced in the process of data collection, however, was getting hold of the most 
relevant progress and evaluation reports. Unfortunately, this difficulty sets certain 
restrictions on our scope for assessing the lessons learned.  
52.  It should furthermore be noted that WB documents on CDD generally emphasise 
positive learning, and documents made public only to a limited extent expose reflections 
on failures and negative experiences. This limits the opportunity for a wider reflection on 
the WB’s own experiences. Since our access to independent evaluation reports has been 
limited we have attempted to find general lessons learned, formulated by mostly unnamed 
authors in various official project description documents.  
53.  In the following review, we will focus on how CDD projects in different conflict 
settings are organised and implemented. An overall question is to what extent the projects 
respond to the challenges of post-conflict contexts. How does the specific conflict 
environment inform the project design?   
Organisation: four partners, but roles differ  
54.  According to Dongier et al. (Dongier et al. 2002)  three broad sets of organisational 
arrangements for CDD can be identified, centred on partnerships between community-
based organisations and (1) local or municipal governments, (2) non-governmental 
organisations or the private sector, and (3) central government or a central fund. In the 
majority of CDD projects that we have examined, all these stakeholders are involved to 
varying degrees. What distinguishes one project from another is the specific role, in terms 
of responsibilities and authority the different parties are assigned.  
55.  In general, CDD projects allocate funds to local communities where community 
groups are formed or activated with the assistance of project facilitators in order to 
identify communal needs. The facilitators work to enhance the community groups’ 
capacity to plan, manage and maintain small projects of different kinds, financed through 
block grants from a central fund or agency. The communities also receive technical 
advice from local government officials or project staff on the projects. In short, the  
communities are empowered through the allocation of control over money and through 
learning democratic project management.  
56.  Social funds. Of the 14 projects reviewed, three were social fund projects (in Angola, 
Kosovo and Burundi). In the last decade the World Bank has financed 108 social funds 
and similar demand-driven multi-sector projects in 57 countries. Social funds are often 
referred to as CDD proper. The general organisational arrangement of social fund 
programmes consists of national NGOs or other associations working with community 
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groups/councils to identify community infrastructure needs and to prepare sub-project 
proposals. The proposals are submitted to the NGO or agency, which in addition to being 
responsible for facilitating local initiatives also handles the distribution of resources 
funding the local sub-projects. Box 3 exemplifies the general organisational features of 
one of the social fund projects reviewed.  
 
Box 3. Organisational Arrangements – Social Fund in Kosovo 
The social fund project in Kosovo is managed by the Community Development Fund (CDF), which 
operates as a non-governmental agency in partnership with the Kosovo Fund for Open Society (a member 
of the Soros/OSI foundation). The local partners are project committees, mobilized by CDF facilitators, and 
municipal authorities. The Serb minority became a vulnerable group in Kosovo after of the war. Project 
documentation shows that the Serb communities were reluctant to participate in the project. In order to 
increase Serb participation the CDF hired a Serb facilitator to work with these communities. The mid-term 
review report finds that the participation of Serb communities since then has significantly improved. 
 When CDF works in rural areas where the local authorities provide few services, the community 
committees are responsible for identifying needs and developing project proposals. In areas where the 
municipal government is more effective in terms of service delivery, they play a more direct role in project 
preparation, supervision, operations and maintenance. Otherwise, the municipal governments are mainly 
involved in the identification of target communities, providing the necessary clearance and permits for 
project implementation. The CDF distributes fund resources, deciding which of the proposals submitted by 
the communities are worthy of financial support. The allocation of money is regulated by an ‘open menu’, 
defining eligible projects into four main sectors: 1) community works; 2) social infrastructure; 3) economic 
infrastructure; and 4) sanitation and the environment. The CDF is also responsible for monitoring the 
projects.  
Source: Kosovo Community Development Fund Project PAD, Mid-term review report January 2002. 
 
57.  Promoting a democratic process. Compared to the social fund projects, the 
Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) in Indonesia and Community Empowerment 
Project (CEP) in East Timor are based on a different organisational arrangement. 
Elections are held at a hamlet level to elect representatives to the village council, and 
from this council a specific number of persons is chosen to represent the village on a sub-
district level. In East Timor a group consisting of women and younger men, traditionally 
groups with less power, monitors the decision-making process at the sub-district level. 
The facilitators are trained people permanently hired by the project. Each village has two 
facilitators who function both as conflict mediators and capacity builders, and who work 
to mobilise collective action in the community. Local government officials serve as 
advisers on technical and project management issues, and independent NGOs monitor the 
project in order to ensure transparency.  
58.  The KDP cycle starts with four to six months of facilitation and planning at sub-
village, village and sub-district levels. In open public meetings the villagers decide upon a 
maximum of two proposals for forwarding to the final round of kecamatan decision 
levels; of the two proposals, one has to come from women. These are in turn submitted to 
the sub-district councils, composed of representatives from all the villages in the sub-
district. At this level the village and their project proposals are competing with other 
communities for project funding. In the first project cycle, however, each village receives 
a fixed sum of money into a village bank account for local distribution to projects through 
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the village council. In the second round a larger sum is allocated directly to the sub-
district level for allocation between the villages based on the selection of project 
proposals. The communities also carry a small part of the financial burden of sub-projects 
though a contribution of cash or labour, to encourage so-called ‘ownership’. Employment 
is also generated through local contracting, also handled by the village councils.  
59.  Another major difference separating the social fund projects from other CDD 
arrangements is the institution responsible for the distribution of project funding; that is, 
deciding which projects deserve funding. In the social fund projects in Angola, Kosovo 
and Burundi this power lies with the implementing institution (the NGO or agency). In 
the projects executed in countries like Rwanda and Indonesia, this is a responsibility 
allocated to the community committees. Another significant difference between the social 
fund projects and the Kecamatan model is the explicit element of competition for funds in 
the latter case.  
60.  Working with traditional institutions. The P.E.A.C.E. initiative led by UNDP in 
Afghanistan represents a somewhat different organisational arrangement. It was launched 
in 1997 in an effort to provide programme coherence to the activities of five different 
rehabilitation and development projects 11 financed by UNDP, and implemented by three 
different UN agencies. The unifying element for these projects was the overall aim of 
poverty reduction and community empowerment. The ‘Strengthening self-help capacities 
in rural communities’ project (re)activated the Afghan council, the shura, traditionally 
adjudicating village disputes, and transformed it into a project management unit (see box 
11). The programme also encouraged the establishment of women’s shuras to make the 
local decision-making process more sensitive to women’s views and needs. The 
committees served as a nexus for needs assessment, credit provision, income generation 
and training for other P.E.A.C.E. activities. The shura structure was incorporated into a 
system of pyramid representation that reached up from villages to district committees on 
three levels: the village, the sub-district/cluster village and the district. Local committees 
managed revolving funds to support crop, livestock and other income generating 
activities. The communities also contributed to carrying project costs with cash and 
labour. The shuras established in this project were also used in the implementation of 
other projects in the programme. It also had an application beyond the limits of the 
programme through serving as contacts and partners for other humanitarian agencies and 
NGOs running projects in the se regions, which suggests the likelihood of sustainability 
after the programme has been brought to closure. 
61.  Creating new forms of CBOs. Another project incorporated in the P.E.A.C.E 
programme was ‘Rebuilding communities in urban areas’, sponsored by UNHCS/ 
Habitat. It focused its efforts mainly on urban areas. The project encouraged the 
establishment of community forums (CFs) in urban neighbourhoods as key decision-
making bodies to address collective needs and establish priorities. The project also 
provided seed capital to establish income generation activities in support of community 
funds, to finance local social services. The CFs were led by a consultative board and 
                                               
11 These projects were: 1) Strengthening self-help capacities in rural communities; 2) Food security through 
sustainable crop production; 3) Rebuilding communities in urban areas; 4) Comprehensive disabled Afghans 
programme; 5) Livestock development for food security. 
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supported by a management team, which carried out the day to day business of the forum. 
This organisational arrangement had the special strength of incorporating a regular 
mechanism for direct community consultation in an urban setting.  
62.   The degree of choice. The majority of projects reviewed are multi-sectoral. This 
implies that resources allocated to the community may be spent to cover diverse local 
needs. Multi-sectoral projects can be very demanding in terms of resources in a conflict 
environment with destroyed infrastructure and deteriorating social services. For instance, 
in the Burundi Community Rehabilitation Project, the country was suffering from a 
deterioration of social services and a continuing polarisation, and few agencies would be 
able to manage multi-sectoral projects. This was an important factor which motivated the 
cooperation between the WB and UNHCR (Brusset et al. 2002). The project proposal is 
guided by a list defining the specific sectors eligible of financial support. In the majority 
of projects this often takes the form of an ‘open menu’, which broadly defines different 
sectoral themes (see box 3). Alternatively, the sub-projects are limited by a negative list, 
stating explicitly for what purposes the fund resources may not be used. For instance, in 
CEP the ‘negative list’ and ‘open menu’ mechanisms are combined. The villages decide 
together about a negative list of items which cannot be funded, and the grants are 
regulated by three types of activities that can be funded; social infrastructure, productive 
economic activities and social welfare activities (Ospina and Tanja 2002) . The projects 
that are multi-sectoral give the communities a greater possibility to define needs, 
compared to single-sector projects with an already predetermined focus (like agriculture 
or health). The CDD projects are mainly directed towards stimulating local initiative in 
terms of economic activity, and the (re)building of social and economic infrastructure, in 
addition to improving access to basic services like schools and health clinics. But does 
this cover the needs of a population recovering from war? Box 4 presents a different 
approach to the development and recovery of communities.    
 
Box 4. Are Community Driven Projects Enough? Experiences from the Philippines 
The armed conflict in Mindanao has caused the deaths of 12 000 people. In 2000, more than 900 000 
Filipinos were forced to flee their homes because of the violent conflict in this part of the country, and in 
January 2001 almost a quarter of a million people were internally displaced, living in the homes of family 
and friends or at evacuation centres. The project design in the CFSI-led project was first and foremost 
directed towards IDPs and one of the project’s main objectives was to ensure an enabling environment for 
safe returns. CFSI applied a psychosocial approach, focusing not only on material and economic support 
but also on the relational and emotional effects of violence. The other CDD projects reviewed had no 
explicit focus on the emotional and physical strains of the population caused by war, or how to help people 
and communities to deal with traumatic experiences. The principal idea seems to be that the repair of social 
capital will automatically occur through community capacity building and the processes revolving around 
the projects. Most of the projects reviewed seemed to have a tendency towards a prioritizing of 
infrastructure projects before health and education projects. 
Source: www.cfsi.ph 
  
63.  Going through phases. The projects most often run in three cycles, each cycle 
usually lasting three to four years. They are usually preceded by a piloting phase where 
the lessons learned from the pilot project create an important basis for further 
development of the project’s design. For instance, the PCF-funded project in Mindanao, 
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Philippines (see box 4) is not only a separate project, but also functions as a pilot for a 
future World Bank social fund project in the same region.  
64.  The CDD projects are designed to be flexible, adapting to changing circumstances 
and drawing on the challenges met and lessons learned. For instance, the first two project 
cycles of KDP in Indonesia focused on local institutional building and poverty alleviation 
in rural communities. The project was originally developed in response to the economic 
crisis in Indonesia. The newly established Support for Conflict-Ridden Areas Project 
(SCRAP), starting April 2003, represents a shift, now focusing exclusively on the 
conflict-ridden areas of Indonesia. The Ministry of Planning in Indonesia developed a 
map pointing out regions prone to public violence, which comprises 26 out of 31 
provinces (World Bank 2003c).The aim of this project is primarily to strengthen 
community-led planning and dispute resolution processes in order to build mechanisms 
that will work against renewed violent conflict. The project aim is therefore clearly 
relevant and responds to one of Indonesia’s major challenges. This project builds on KDP 
but it funds different activities and requires a different facilitation and cooperation 
structure (see text box 5). This illustrates how projects may evolve and transform over 
time. 
 
Box 5. Community Driven Reconstruction in Indonesia: Project Design and the 
Challenge of Regional Violent Conflict 
The violent conflicts that we see in Indonesia today are extremely complex, and represent a threat not only 
to state power but also to macroeconomic stability as investments in Indonesia are perceived as risky.  
Many of the causes of these conflicts may be traced to Indonesia’s institutional weakness and the transition 
to a new institutional regime. The sudden loss of executive control with the ending of the Suharto regime 
allowed latent conflicts to turn into different cases of regional violence. The conflicts have had several 
negative effects: economic decline, a loss of services such as health and education, and a cyclical 
recurrence of violence. The core challenge for community development in post-conflict environments is to 
prevent violence from reoccurring. A common denominator underlying all of Indonesia’s community level 
conflicts is that they feed on an absence of mediating institutions that can resolve and channel local level 
conflicts. 
The SCRAP project comprises three main components. The first component is designed to promote local-
level reconciliation; the second is directed towards restarting productive activity and creating jobs; and the 
third is designed to improve access to, and improve the quality of education and health services. The first 
component, called ‘Community development, reconciliation and dispute resolution’ builds on KDP. Even 
though earlier KDP provides the beginning of a framework for community level reconstruction, the original 
project was not designed for peace building.  This  project planning will (as in KDP) take place in project 
locations, but it is different in terms of what is considered basic units of cooperation and decision-making.  
Instead of different villages competing for project funding, a minimum of two villages cooperate in the 
development of project proposals. Socio-cultural programmes that promote cross-village encounters (such 
as sports and cultural performance) also receive funding. The project thus promotes the strengthening of 
relationships between communities over intra-community relations. The inter-village forums already 
established through KDP will review the inter-village investment proposals. Another difference is  that KDP 
favours decisions that benefits larger groups. This project will provide additional targeted investments 
responding to the needs of smaller vulnerable groups. The facilitation in KDP was directed towards 
participatory investment planning and the facilitators hired were mostly young and recruited from 
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neighbouring provinces . In Indonesia village level experience show that conflicts are most successfully 
handled by older people, with strong roots and broad networks in the communities. This understanding will 
guide the recruiting of facilitators in the project. 
Another pressing issue in Indonesia, and a source of conflict, concerns the question of land and boundaries.  
As a means of counteracting the prevalence of land disputes in rural Indonesia, NGOs introduce community 
mapping programmes into regions with boundary-related land conflicts. Getting communities to map and 
judge what they think are the correct boundaries is hoped to be the first step towards giving a referent in 
such disputes. In addition, the component works to strengthen and develop both formal and informal 
mechanisms for local-level dispute resolution, linking up to the legal system on various levels. Each village 
also nominates men and women representatives as dispute mediators and receives special training in 
conflict mediation. The third cycle of KDP can be seen as an important step towards accommodating the 
general principles of CDD in a project design developed to address special challenges of conflict in 
Indonesia. 
Source: PAD: Third Kecamatan Development Project :  Support for Conflict-Ridden Areas Project (World 
Bank 2003c) 
Objectives and project components: Adjusting to the conflict context 
65.  What does one hope to achieve by handing down control over resources and decisions 
to local communities in a post-conflict environment? The goals of the projects reviewed 
are multiple and ambitious. They seek to meet urgent economic and social needs of the 
population, build representative, inclusive and sustainable institutions on a local level; 
improve institutional capacity on a local governmental level; promote reconciliation 
across lines of conflict through processes of cooperation; and build local institutions for 
conflict mediation to raise the threshold for turning to violence.  
66.  All the projects include a component of community development, where funds are 
allocated to local communities, in which community groups are mobilised with the 
assistance of project facilitators in order to identify communal needs. The facilitators 
work to enhance the community groups’ capacity to plan, manage and maintain small 
projects of different kinds, financed through block grants from a central fund or agency.  
67.  Looking at CDD projects first implemented in post-conflict settings, the project 
components and specific objectives do not substantially differ from the CDD projects 
functioning in more stable environments. There has been a gradual acknowledgement of 
the special challenges posed in a post-conflict climate, and that these factors need to be 
taken into consideration to ensure that community empowerment projects ‘do no harm’. 
This is reflected both through a call for more systematic knowledge of conflict and its 
mechanisms, of which this concept paper is an example, and through expressing a need 
for CDD projects more specifically tailored to meet challenges encountered in conflict 
context.  
68.  Understanding the causes of conflict. This trend is reflected in the development of 
the social action project in Angola. It started out in 1995 with poverty and poverty 
reduction as its main concern. Widespread poverty is obviously a crucial side-effect of 
violent conflict, and Angolan society struggled, and is still struggling, with this problem. 
The objective of the first cycle was therefore clearly relevant. However, the special 
challenges of implementing a social fund project in communities that had experienced a 
brutal civil war for decades were not reflected in the project components. In contrast, the 
third project cycle starting this year has broadened its scope to include conflict as an 
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explicit factor in the design. The standard ‘community development’ component which 
aims at fostering ‘human capital building by bringing communities together’ (Human 
Development 2003) is typically a cornerstone in the design. In addition, however, it is 
acknowledged that we know too little about how the post-conflict situation influences 
social capital building, which is stated as one of the main objectives in the project. A pilot 
study is therefore included in the design to learn more about the impact of conflict, and to 
assess vulnerability to determine which of the population groups have been most affected 
by conflict in terms of impairing their ability to escape poverty.  
 
Box 6. The Utility of Legal Assistance: Lessons from Burundi Community 
Rehabilitation Project  
The grant from the PCF was given to facilitate preparations for the return of refugees  living in refugee 
camps in Tanzania. The project’s objective was rehabilitation of infrastructure, building local capacity and 
supporting self management achievements by the local population. The sub-projects covered i)activities 
relating to economic security; ii) construction work (schools, health centres, roads) and iii) legal advice and 
judicial support (aimed at both local population and Ministry of Justice). The evaluation reports states that 
the first project category was poorly understood by the beneficiaries, while they attached most significance 
to construction work and legal advice. Legal issues are among the most sensitive ones after a long history of 
forced migration and civil war, and this programme has increased in importance over time. The legal 
assistance took on two forms. A ‘mobile legal clinic’ was established to play a role in mediation, 
conciliation and information, and awareness-raising among the communities. This was done through public 
meetings, and through individual legal assistance. In addition one sub-project aimed at supporting the 
efforts to professionalise tribunals and strengthen the independence of the judiciary in the target provinces. 
The reports concludes that an integrated approach to justice, even though it may be perceived as politically 
threatening by the authorities, are very useful both as a means for people to express their views and to help 
settle legal disputes. The authors recommend adopting a ‘dual approach’, where for instance construction 
projects are developed in conjunction with legal projects.  
Source: Brusset et al. 2002  
  
69.  Two interesting findings stand out from the Burundi project. The above case 
illustrates the importance returning migrants place on settling land disputes , as this might 
be a precondition for them to resettle and restart economic activities in their livelihoods. 
The second finding points towards a language/literacy barrier existing between the 
government administration and the local population, in this case inhibiting longer term 
planning as the villagers felt they were not allowed ownership over these processes. On 
the contrary, the report states that the most promising sub-projects from the social aspect 
point of view sprung from the spontaneous and unorganised contracts with the population 
in connection with the implementation of projects, where local government officials had 
less control (Brusset et al. 2002). 
70.  As with the Angolan project, several projects include components that aim at 
strengthening research capacity in the country involved and collecting more 
systematically knowledge on general issues important to the project. Poverty has been 
one of the recurring themes in such components, but increasingly attention is devoted to 
conflict and its mechanisms.  
71.  Microfinance sustainability. Many of the projects include a sub-component for 
income generating activities, which often take the form of microfinance and revolving 
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loans, where small loans are distributed from a fixed sum of money to finance small local 
business activities. The loans have to be repaid before new loans can be issued. This 
project component has had mixed success. In both Angola and Burundi the income 
generating activities ceased to exist before the first cycle of the project was concluded. 
The micro-credit component in the Angolan project was halted because of sustainability 
problems, the complexity of the activities, the high cost per beneficiary and the lack of 
staff to handle the challenges. In addition, the payback rate turned out to be unsatisfactory 
(Implementation Completion Report 2001). In the KDP project in Indonesia it is noted, 
however, that a large number of lenders were women. Despite women being equally 
represented in the community councils, practical experience showed that women took 
part in the decision-making processes to a lesser extent. In spite of mixed experiences 
with the micro-credit component, it may in some cases function as a means of reaching 
women, who are ‘muted’ in community council contexts. 
72.  Transparency. To mitigate the problem of widespread corruption the KDP 
programme stressed the importance of transparency in particular. The project was 
designed to keep processes and financial management simple, so that stakeholders could 
easily understand and use them. As a means to promote transparency, the project had 
several design mechanisms for wide information dissemination, open financial 
management and internal and external monitoring. Information on the project and 
financial operations was disseminated internally through meetings reporting on projects 
and progress, and through information boards at village and sub-district level, to stimulate 
internal monitoring. Government officials also conducted routine monitoring. In addition, 
a network of journalists and forty NGOs contributed to the external monitoring. The 
Programme stressed regular monitoring by consultants at all levels. Compared to other 
organisations, UN and NGOs alike, the WB seems to have taken far more extensive 
measures to bring corruption issues up for broader discussion and introduced measures to 
prevent it and deal with it when/if it occurs. 
 Area coverage: from national to village cluster    
73.  The projects reviewed vary enormously in their geographical scope. The KDP in 
Indonesia has a national range, covering 20 of Indonesia’s 26 provinces, including more 
than 9000 villages, and reaching some 25 million people. The Mindanao project covered 
one conflict-ridden region in the Philippines, working in 28 villages, and assisting some 
33 500 persons, most of them displaced by the armed conflict. The Self-reliance project 
in the Samagrelo region in Georgia concentrated on seven villages, where members of 
3000 families received training on agriculture-related issues.  
74.  Area development projects. Most of the projects, however, did not have a national 
scope and could fit the definition of what is commonly known as ‘area development 
schemes’. They operate in selected provinces or districts of the country, chosen according 
to diverse criteria, attempt to respond to local needs in a comprehensive manner, 
mobilising community self -help, local decision-making, civil society organizations and 
private sector enterprise (Bernander, 2002). One main critique directed towards area 
development schemes is that they address issues of national scope and importance in a 
piecemeal fashion: while some regions and communities benefit, others do not. A second 
question is whether these projects are sufficiently broad in scope to bring about overall 
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change across the country. Some CDD projects compensate with a quick scaling up, and 
through encouraging an integration of community councils in the governmental structure 
(as in Indonesia, East Timor and Rwanda). Related to these concerns is the question of 
how the different districts are selected and groups targeted.  
75.  Obstacles to scaling up in conflict settings. In conflict contexts the security situation 
may impede the projects from scaling up. Several of the projects experienced renewed 
violent conflict in the areas they were working. In some cases they had to start over again 
implementing sub-projects, or the project had to be discontinued until the security 
situation had improved. Another factor that influences the potential for up-scaling is the 
capacity of the central administration, which is likely to be weakened by a long-lasting 
war. Capacity is an important issue in the coordination of programs on a larger scale. 
Ruined infrastructure/ communications and difficult conditions for fiscal transfer 
represent additional obstacles to scale.  
Targeting: balancing need, security and capacity 
76. Differences between rural and urban settings. Most of the CDD projects were 
implemented in rural settings where village communities constituted the basis of CBOs. 
Only two of the projects operated exclusively in urban settings: the Habitat project under 
the P.E.A.C.E. programme in Afghanistan, and the Tuzla project in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina implemented by the NGO ‘Friends of Bosnia’. In order to become self-
reliant the central government in Bosnia and Herzegovina has developed an economic 
development strategy where the main goal is the creation of ‘an entrepreneurial society’. 
The CDD project implemented in Tuzla supports this national strategy through aiming at 
developing the social and human capital needed for an entrepreneurial society. It provides 
a radically different CDD design, bringing together municipal government, business and 
local NGO stakeholders in a collaborate effort to improve public space, and build social 
and human capital through a trust-building process across ethnic boundaries, bringing 
people together through common interests. One important factor differentiating this 
project design from others was the fact that the CBOs were not territorially defined 
through village or urban neighbourhoods, but were community organisations (NGOs or 
citizens’ associations). Another unusual component was the role assigned to private 
business in the project (for more details on this project see textbox 7).   
 
Box 7. Linkages between Market, Government and Community: Bosnian 
Experiences 
On paper, the programme ‘The New Initiative for Tuzla’ intends to bring together local government, 
business community and community organizations to implement public infrastructure projects, called 
‘community works projects’. Community organization members are encouraged to devise job-creating 
funding proposals for the projects. A committee approves applicant community organizations for a 
community work project according to two criteria: (1) the organisation’s commitment to the values of a 
multi-ethnic open society, and (2) the viability of the job-creating funding proposals. These organizations 
receive funding in proportion to their contribution of volunteer work on the public infrastructure projects, as 
micro-investments in their organizations. The municipality assumes full responsibility for providing all 
necessary material and expertise, while the business community contributes with funding in return for 
marketing opportunities.   
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The first grant performance report on the period October 2002 to April 2003 demonstrates that the project 
met unexpected problems. The first five months of the project revealed that overcoming a lack of trust in 
post-conflict Bosnia represented a formidable challenge. The municipal government suddenly proved 
unwilling to participate in the project, and wanted the World Bank fund transferred to other projects. There 
was also revealed misuse of project resources in one of the central NGOs participating in the project. The 
implementing NGO ‘Friends of Bosnia’ tried to reform the partner NGO, without sufficient success. Efforts 
were made to persuade the mayor to endorse the project, which was crucial for the necessary participation 
of local government. Friends of Bosnia finally succeeded in securing the involvement of local government, 
and in recruiting strategic NGO partners. One tree planting project was then launched. NGO volunteer 
workers contributed 779 professional labour hours planting 219 trees throughout Tuzla.  
A preliminary experience based on the first implemented infrastructure project is that when finally 
commencing it proved effective in overcoming distrust and bringing together local stakeholders for a joint 
effort towards a positive change. The project design hinges on the willingness of all the stakeholders to 
contribute. The experience with the sudden withdrawal of local government revealed that their involvement 
was crucial for this project design to work. To make all the stakeholders cooperate, the implementing 
organization had to fight its way through competing agendas. By setting a central criterion of transparency, 
the project may prove to strengthen healthy NGOs, and contribute to the building of cooperative links 
between the three partners.     
Source:  Friends of Bosnia, 2003a 
 
77.  Insecurity influences selection of regions. Regions were targeted after 
predetermined criteria ranging from socioeconomic factors to local organisational 
capacities, level of poverty, the degree to which the community has been afflicted by 
violence, the remoteness of the localities, and security conditions in the regions. The 
general criterion for CDD in post-conflict reconstruction is to try to reach those areas and 
people who have suffered the most and are most needy. However, the security conditions 
in these areas and their remoteness may not always allow for an implementation of CDD 
because of safety concerns on the part of the project staff, and practical obstacles that 
make elections and the transfer of resources too difficult. In the first social action project 
in Angola, the Bank went against the central government’s wishes by implementing the 
project in what were considered insecure regions, which implied that many poor people in 
need of assistance would not be reached. It appears, however, to have been changes in 
terms of viewing CDD not only as a means to reconstruction and development, but as a 
potential tool in conflict resolution and peace-building in non-secure areas. 
78.   Receiving capacity matters. In order to be successful, the CDD approach requires a 
certain level of organisational capacity within the communities in question. Since all the 
projects practise the principle of ‘ownership’ through a local contribution of cash or 
labour, the communities also need a certain level of resources to be able to participate. 
The willingness of the communities to participate is also a necessary prerequisite for 
introducing these projects. For instance, the Somalia Health Service Recovery Project 
aimed at developing a system, strategy and tools to convert a network of 49 community 
health centres into a sustainable service that would form part of the future health sector in 
Somalia. The project was a result of the cooperation between the International Federation 
of Red Crescent, Somalia Red Crescent Society and the World Bank. The health project 
sprang from the idea that the long-term recovery of local services in post-conflict 
environments could only be ensured through the empowerment of local communities to 
participate fully in the running and resourcing of their health facilities. Three conditions 
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were predefined as necessary for introducing the project in communities: 1) the 
willingness of the community to engage; 2) the availability of sufficient resources to 
contribute to the service; and 3) the technical capacities of individual community 
members to support the service.   
79.  Special measures to involve vulnerable groups. The CDD approach, as it is 
reflected in the projects reviewed, mostly works with villages or urban neighbourhoods to 
identify needs, and to plan and implement projects. Basically CDD is a holistic approach, 
focusing on the community as a whole. The projects have, however, mechanisms that are 
designed to ensure the participation of vulnerable groups in the decision-making process. 
Some of the projects also have separate sub-components, targeting vulnerable groups 
such as single female households (KDP III Indonesia), disabled persons (P.E.A.C.E 
Afghanistan), internally displaced people (Georgia), or ex-combatants. It involves a 
delicate balance between helping vulnerable groups and helping the community as a 
whole, as textbox 8 illustrates. 
 
Box 8. Targeting Groups or Entire Communities? Philippine and Georgian 
Experiences 
Mindanao, a region in the Philippines, has experienced armed conflict over the last thirty years. The region 
is marked by the large number of people internally displaced. Community and Family Services 
International (CFSI) is a social development organisation based in the Philippines that works to help 
displaced people. CFSI received funding from PCF to implement a project targeting first and foremost IDPs 
in the Mindanao province. The objective was to develop enabling conditions that encourage safe returns in 
order to facilitate the process of transition and stabilization.  
In order to encourage IPDs to return home and to map out what needed to be done to facilitate a secure 
return, CFSI in Mindanao arranged ‘Go -and-See Visits’. These tours included ‘Site Development Planning’ 
carried out by the IDPs in the evacuation centres with support from CFSI, to identify anticipated needs 
related to the return. The communities of origin were involved in planning to prevent conflicts occurring 
when the IDPs returned to their homes. Even though the communities were engaged in the process of 
repatriation, the CFSI mainly focused on IDPs. A livelihood assistance programme was developed in 
response to urgent financial needs and targeted exclusively IDPs. One financial scheme was designed for 
implementation at the evacuation centres (Start-Up Capital Assistance), the other was designated as start -up 
capital upon return (Livelihood Assistance Upon Return). The latter programme put greater emphasis on 
building social cohesion through group work, and was intended to serve as a ‘pull factor’ to encourage IDPs 
to return home. The teams receiving financial support were returning IDPs only, and did not include the rest 
of the home community.  In one of the progress reports CFSI remarked that this represented a po tential 
conflict between the people returning to their homes and those who chose not to flee, and would have to be 
treated with extra caution.  
In contrast to the project in Mindanao, the IDP project in the Samagrelo region of Georgia, implemented by 
a NGO (Acción contra el Hambre), sought to integrate IDPs into their host communities, targeting villages 
as a whole. When organizing cooperatives to engage in diverse agricultural activities, IDPs and locals 
together comprised the groups, encouraging integration and mutual solidarity through cooperation and joint 
efforts to make different kinds of agricultural production work. These two projects were implemented in 
two completely different environments. CFSI struggled to implement their project in an extremely difficult 
security situation of ongoing violent conflict, while the Georgian region was mainly struggling with poverty 
and low-income related issues. In the Philippines the main aim was to help people to return to their homes, 
while the Georgian project sought to integrate IDPs into host communities. These examples reveal a 
dilemma in CDD projects: How can one reach the most vulnerable without causing conflict? And how can 
one reach the most vulnerable people when focusing on the community as a whole? 
Sources: www.cfsi.ph and Acción contra el Hambre 
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CBOs: establishing or reactivating? 
80.  Resistance from local power holders. An important discussion is if  CDD projects 
should build upon already existing CBOs rather than creating completely new ones. The 
advantage offered by building on already existing organisational structures is that the 
local population is familiar with the institution and how it works. This enhances the 
sustainability of the CBOs and therefore the sustainability of the project. Building on 
existing organisations may, however, have drawbacks; institutions may tend to favour 
particular groups and are often not representative of the entire community. The projects 
that choose to build on existing communal institutions are therefore often extended to be 
more inclusive.  In East Timor, for instance, the traditional local power holders were 
deliberately bypassed when the village councils were elected. This was done at the 
request of Timorese leadership, who wanted to establish new, and more representative 
councils. The bypassing of traditional power holders gave rise to local tensions between 
new and old power structures (See box 9). The choice between using already existing 
CBOs and creating new ones is a crucial issue when designing a CDD project.  
 
Box 9. Traditional Structures v. Creation of New Institutions: The Timorese  
           Experience 
The selection of hamlet representatives to the Village Development Council (VDC) was organised by a 
selection committee consisting of the hamlet chief and two trusted members, one male and one female. This 
committee was to organise a democratic process, asking community members to identify male and female 
potential candidates.  One female and one male representative were then elected as members of the VDC. 
Elders and village heads were excluded from candidacy. An evaluation report demonstrated that the 
education and experience of the candidates were the most important criteria for the election of community 
representatives, rather than descent. This resulted in young literate people who either had ‘project 
experience’ or had proven themselves to be good leaders in the war for independence gained access to 
power in a society where traditionally old age, descent and power are intertwined. Traditional power is 
divided between political and religious authority, based on lineage – belonging to ‘the House’, which 
traditionally holds the power. In contrast, neither age nor descent mattered in the choice of VDC 
representatives. And in contrast to many elders who are illiterate, the elected young people were able to 
fulfil the CEP requirement of literacy. As a result, the council was seen as solely functional without the 
traditional political tasks of decision-making and conflict resolution. The role of the VDC is therefore not in 
direct conflict with traditional powers. The evaluation report concludes that the lack of seniority in these 
councils has contributed to the fact that the councils have not yet developed real power. But still it has been 
noted that the exclusion of traditional power has caused tension in some of the villages, and may be a cause 
of conflict if and when the VDC develops real power. There are also indications, however, that traditional 
power works complementarily to the VDC in terms of solving disputes that arise from project decisions, 
implementation and management and do not find a solution within the VDC.   
Sources: Ospina and Hohe, 2002 
 
81.  Lack of trust. Mobilizing local communities to take part in the project may represent 
a challenge. In Angola, one reason for variable regional success was partly attributed to 
the fact that the facilitators did not succeed in persuading communities to participate. 
There may be a number of reasons why communities may be difficult to mobilize. As 
noted earlier, one widespread effect of violent conflict is the weakening of the 
relationship between the government and communities in terms of trust. Lack of trust in 
government or facilitators promoting the project may be reasons why communities 
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choose to decline the offer. Once the community groups have been mobilized and 
elections arranged, the projects face another challenge in motivating elected community 
members to spend their time representing the village in the time-consuming planning and 
management process (see box 10). 
 
Box 10. Compensation of Community Council Members: The Cases of Rwanda and 
          East Timor 
In the Community Development Committees (CDC) in Rwanda a considerable amount of time and effort 
were involved in building the local capacities of the CDCs to prepare the committees for the various aspects 
and challenges of project management. However, because of the heavy workload of CDC members many 
voiced discontent. They had not expected that their involvement would demand so much of their time, and 
some even claimed that the project was impoverishing them, through the fact that the time tied up in 
meetings and training pulled them away from economic activities. The question of time spent and 
compensation may influence the motivation of community representatives to attend training activities and 
meetings. In East Timor the evaluation report notes that women representatives often experienced 
disagreement with their husbands over the issue that their time was bound up in community matters which 
did not bring any economic contribution to the household.  This brings forward the issue of compensation 
for council members. Many fear that if money were to be given, this would increase the risk of elite capture 
and corruption. This is a general question confronting the projects.  
Sources: Ospina and Hohe, 2002; World Bank 2001c 
 
 Capacity building and planning: careful preparation is essential  
82.  Time a critical factor. As mentioned earlier, the KDP project spent four to six 
months on facilitation and planning. Since the community plays a central role in the 
project, it is underscored in several of the project documents that an understanding among 
the community members of the project and the community group’s function and 
responsibility is essential for success (see box 10). Without thorough preparation, project 
experience shows that unwanted side effects like elite capture and corruption are more 
likely to occur. In a post-conflict environment, however, time may be scarce. In East 
Timor, for instance, less time was spent planning because of the immediate needs of the 
population. Shortly after the CBOs had been established, the villages received an 
emergency grant, a fixed sum of money distributed equally within the villages for 
covering emergency needs.  
83.  Assisting project formulation. In the cases of KDP in Indonesia, and CEP in East 
Timor, the planning starts at sub-village level where facilitators (NGOs or locally 
employed consultants) help develop the project proposals. Each of the sub-village units 
submits their proposals to the village council, where a number of projects are selected.  
The second grant cycle had an element of competition, under which each of the villages 
could submit a maximum of 4 proposals, half of which had to be from women’s groups, 
to the sub-district council of elected representatives from each village. Here their 
proposals competed for project funding with other villages. The element of explicit 
competition is unique to the KDP and CEP project design. In contrast, in Rwanda the 
Community Development Council (CDC) used extra time to develop a three-year 
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Community Development Plan in which the needs and priorities of the community were 
established.  
84.  Starting with small money. In CDD projects it is common to start out with small 
grants and then gradually increase the amount of money which the community councils or 
sub-district councils manage. After going through a phase of capacity building, planning 
and prioritizing of projects, the councils may find that the block grant is too small to 
cover the most needed project, which is a potential frustration for the communities. In 
countries where a functioning bank system is non-existent, it is of crucial importance to 
have a well thought through system of disbursement so that the projects can start to be 
implemented as soon as the planning is finished and decisions are made. This is important 
in making sure that community members in a fragile initial phase do not lose the 
motivation to participate or lose faith in the projects’ ability to deliver basic services.  
85.  Using local facilitators. The role of facilitators is vital in the capacity building of 
CBOs, in encouraging positive local processes and in the dissemination of information. 
The respondents on the Mindanao project pointed out, amongst other things, that the 
decision to hire and build the capacity of local professionals with different ethnic and 
religious backgrounds was important in a heterogeneous region. One of the success 
factors mentioned in the KDP project was the high availability of educated but 
unemployed people, who were hired as facilitators for the project, and who were willing 
to work for lower pay (Edstrom 2002). 
 
Box 11. The Importance of Facilitation13  
A comparison of different strategies for the development of community based organis ations in Afghanistan, 
often termed shuras, reveals striking differences as to how community based they were and what roles they 
assumed. Traditionally such shuras were primarily involved in the settling of conflicts within the village, 
open to the participation of all the men of the village(s) and generally consensus oriented. While one NGO 
only focused on the composition and selection criteria for the (men only) development shura  and its 
involvement in project selection, the other NGO undertook an elaborate PRA exercise with separate female 
and male shuras before establishing a list of common village priorities. Government and representatives of 
UN agencies were here invited to the PRA exercise, emphasis was placed on the development of the shura  
and within a wider district village shuras were later linked up in a district council, enabling and 
encouraging collaboration and joint district projects. 
A survey in these two villages revealed that the villagers and the shura members had a very different 
understanding of and perception of their respective roles. Within the first village neither the shura  nor the 
villagers had a clear understanding of what the shura was expected to do and achieve, most people were not 
at all informed about the proposed projects and the large majority still believed that the shura’s 
responsibility was to solve community disputes. They had in general a negative attitude towards the NGO, 
claiming that only a few persons in the village had been able to benefit from the NGO assistance. On the 
other hand, in the second village, which had undergone the PRA exercise and capacity building process, 
people regarded the shura  as a community development body, and were well aware of which projects the 
NGO and the villagers had agreed to prioritise in the village.  
Source: Strand, 2003 
 
                                               
13 For further details on the shura  function in Afghanistan see Harpviken, Strand and Ask (2002) Civil Society in 
Afghanistan, Commissioned Report, Bergen, CMI 
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86.  The methods used in capacity building and planning were in most cases participatory.  
The Rwanda development and reintegration project (RDRP) in particular used PRA as its 
main method for gaining knowledge about specific communities, for planning projects, 
and for building capacity in both communities and local governments. 
The role of local and central government 
87.  Avoiding obstruction. The projects include cooperation with local government to 
varying degrees. In Rwanda RDRP, the relationship between local government and 
communities devoted special attention to the design because of its previous participation 
in the atrocities during the civil war. To avoid the risk of obstruction in the decision-
making process that was likely to occur if Community Development Committees (CDC) 
were established as parallel structures to local authorities, the CDCs were instead 
composed of both elected representatives from the communities, and government officials 
(Cliffe et. al. 2003).  
88.   Building capacity. Another potential problem in post-conflict environments is the 
low level of institutional capacity on the part of local government. In some cases local 
government may be close to non-existent, and a partnership is therefore difficult to 
develop.  Since the linkage between the communities and the government structure is 
deemed important, some of the projects also emphasise the strengthening of local 
government. The Angolan Social Action Project, for instance, included capacity building 
as an effort not only in community groups, but also in NGOs and local government.  
89.  Bypassing. In the KDP project, local government structures were bypassed in the 
transferring of block grants, which went directly to the village’s own bank account. This 
was done mainly because the standard fiscal transfers would go faster so that the projects 
decided upon locally could be realised quickly. Speed was an important concern in the 
project design. Another argument for bypassing local government with the cash flow was 
the problem of widespread corruption at all levels of government in Indonesia, which had 
also contributed to weakening the trust between citizens and the state apparatus. 
However, the local administration provided technical advice for the planning and 
management of the project, in addition to contributing with some amount of funding. 
Judith Edstrom (2002) remarks that it is a danger when introducing a well-financed 
parallel structure to produce the undesirable consequence of weakening the government. 
It may also weaken the sustainability of community councils if and when the project no 
longer receives funding. In post-conflict settings, where governmental institutions have 
survived, but need rebuilding, this design may have a counterproductive affect. 
90.  Selection of a governmental lead agency. The central government agencies have a 
central role in coordinating and leading the projects. The implementing agency is often 
placed within one of the government ministries. A general challenge in the project design 
is the identif ication of  a capable government agency to lead the project, and to ensure 
sufficient administrative autonomy to avoid political interference in the implementation 
of the project. The ministries responsible for social welfare and community development 
have often been weak in terms of power and staff. In several of the Bank projects other 
and more powerful ministries, often economic or other sectoral ministries have been 
selected as partners (Edstrom, 2002). The KDP, however, chose the Community 
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Development Department in the less powerful Ministry of Home Affairs to implement the 
project. There were several reasons for this choice: (1) the KDP would be a bigger unit in 
this ministry and therefore have more influence; (2) the Ministry of Home Affairs had 
less vested interest in pushing one specific sector, which is an advantage for an ‘open 
menu’ design; (3) the ministry was willing to hand over some of its power to the project 
management consultants, and its interference was less than it would have been in more 
powerful ministries; and (4) it benefits from the administrative, political and logistical 
support of the ministry (Edstrom, 2002). 
91.  CDD can be politically controversial. Implementation of CDD hinges on the 
cooperation and endorsement of the project from the central government. The history of 
the CEP project in East Timor demonstrates how a planned project may be endangered by 
lacking support from the central authorities. Before its implementation, the project 
became a source of disagreement between the World Bank and the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The CEP objectives were to 
establish transparent, democratic and accountable local structures in rural areas to make 
decisions about development projects in a decentralized fashion. Influential individuals 
within the UNTAET strongly opposed the project, fearing a loss of control over the 
significant fund resources and that the new structures would challenge the UNTAET 
governmental structure. However, due to strong pressure the UNTAET finally gave in, 
and the project was successfully implemented (East Timor Institute for Reconstruction 
Monitoring and Analysis, 2000). This example demonstrates how a decentralisation 
process may be perceived as threatening to central state power.  
 
Box 12. Preventing Projects from Overlapping with other Investment Plans  
Source: Codippily et al., 2002 
In CDD projects where a separate association or fund assists local communities to identify communal 
needs and to develop and implement sub-projects without including the governmental structures, there 
is a risk that projects identified locally and programmes planned by the government or by other donor 
organisations may overlap. For instance, a local community decides that they want to improve the 
road leading to the municipal trade centre, not knowing that the government is developing 
programmes to improve the roads in the district. The community could thus have spent the money to 
cover other needs. The Community Development Fund (CDC) in Kosovo realized after the project 
pilot phase that it was necessary to develop a policy to ensure that CDF investments were well 
coordinated with municipal investment plans. They decided that no project would be approved unless 
the following conditions were met: 
· The municipality had to be informed of and approve the project. 
· The CDF double-checked with the relevant sector department to ensure the project fitted the 
overall sector policies. 
· The project design had been submitted for technical approval by the competent municipal 
body. 
· All necessary permits had been obtained. 
· The CDF double-checked with other donors to ensure no one else was considering financing 
the same project. 
In projects of the Kecamatan kind, where, in place of the fund administration like in the Kosovo 
project, the villagers in the sub-district council themselves decide which projects deserve funding, 
similar mechanisms should be built in so that the villagers are able to make informed choices. An 
important question is thus how CDD projects can be linked up with other initiatives and structures. 
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Section 3:  
Lessons and questions  
  
92.  From the feedback on our questionnaire and a review of WB documents a picture 
emerges of how the WB judges its experiences of implementing CDD projects in conflict 
contexts, and how this learning is then reflected in presentations and project documents.  
93.   Need for scrutiny of negative experiences. Throughout this review of CDD 
experience in conflict contexts certain themes appears to be understudied or not well 
enough documented to form a solid foundation for conclusion on or advocacy for the 
CDD approach. That being stated, the WB deserves credit for the extensive research that 
has been undertaken prior to the establishment of these projects, for the close follow -up 
throughout the implementation process, and for the number of independent studies that 
have been commissioned to assess the projects. The future challenge for all CDD 
stakeholders is therefore to ensure that both positive and negative learning is fed back 
into the review process.  
Lessons about overall impact 
Poverty 
94.   War impoverishes both the economy and the population of affected countries. 
Violent conflicts hit poor people hardest, driving them further into poverty. According to 
WB staff the CDD approach has proved useful in terms of addressing poverty related-
issues, as many of the CDD projects in conflict contexts focus on the establishment of 
basic social services, on rebuilding economic infrastructure, and on income generating 
activities. Concrete evidence of the advantage of CDD compared to other methods of 
poverty reduction is, however, lacking, possibly due to the short time the CDD approach 
has been in use.  
95.  The poor may not be in the position to articulate demands. We know that poor 
and socially excluded groups, in general, have difficulties in responding to the 
opportunities created by CDD-type projects. Addressing the needs of such groups may 
often require more targeted and supply driven-approaches. We note that this dilemma has 
not been fully discussed in the documents reviewed, and that there seems to be a general 
assumption that CDD will alleviate poverty just because it operates at community level 
and is demand driven. In a review of CDD projects implemented in East Asia and the 
Pacific Region Kudat and Özbilgin (2001: 4) finds that ’the poverty and participation 
focus of CDD is not maintained during implementation’, which could indicate that it is 
difficult to directly address some of the root cause to poverty through CDD. Some of the 
poorest or most marginalised groups might be reluctant to claim their rights. This might 
be due to deep-rooted traditions or fear of punishment if they challenge local power 
holders and/or conflict entrepreneurs, or upset those who have traditionally supported 
them throughout hard times. Overcoming these fears is likely to be a longer process 
  41 
where capacity building and active and targeted support for the CBOs might be required, 
and, certainly, a degree of security and rule of law. 
96.  Programme scaling up - a challenge. There are a number of conflict characteristics 
that might pose challenges for scaling up of CDD programmes. Inevitably, needs will 
vary within a country depending on the degree and types of conflict caused destruction, 
and the composition of the population, i.e. number of returnees and/or demobilised 
soldiers. One type of programmes might therefore only be needed in a relatively limited 
area, and as such not be useful to consider for scaling-up. The degree and types of 
remaining conflicts is another challenge that might be difficult to overcome at a district or 
province level, where CBOs will have to prioritise between types of projects and areas to 
prioritise. And, matters might be made more complicated if the government wish to 
prioritise certain areas over others. If such decisions are not based on documented needs 
but rather done to favour their supporters or to ‘buy’ the support of opposing groups , it 
might easily initiate new conflicts. A lack of reliable baseline data and accurate aid 
disbursement figures might make scaling up prioritisation more difficult for the 
government, whereas criticism is made easier for their opposition.   
97.   Reconciliation before development. Furthermore, in conflict-contexts it may be 
even more difficult to respond to the needs of the poorest. We note, for instance, that the 
third cycle of the KDP project has set local-level reconciliation as the first project 
component, with restarting of productive activities and creating jobs as the second one.  
This could indicate an understanding that more sustainable poverty reduction efforts will 
require a greater degree of stability and reconciliation at the community level. 
  
Trust building and reconciliation 
98.  The expectation of the CDD process with the formation of village CBOs and sub-
district groups is that it will build trust among the involved parties and aid the post-
conflict reconciliation process. CDD is to provide a secure and predictable environment 
with clarified power relationships within the village, between villages and towards local 
and central government bodies. Capacity building of the various stakeholders can lay the 
groundwork for more permanent changes. There is nevertheless a range of questions that 
arise in this regards, not least how to measure the impact of the trust-building and 
reconciliation efforts, and how to determine the degree of facilitation and commitment 
required to enable a wider and ‘scaled up’ reconciliation process.    
99.   Creating a framework for dispute mediation. Experience from Indonesia shows 
that the establishment of participatory community processes to address collective needs 
may provide a useful framework for negotiations and dispute mediation at the local level. 
In conflict areas the CDD process might provide the communities with a peaceful forum 
to solve their practical problems. This finding is supported by experience from 
Afghanistan where the project design and negotiation phase was used to bring together 
again societies forcibly divided by the conflict, through ensuring their involvement in the 
project management.   
100. Allowing women larger influence. The explicit demand from the WB for 
including women in the CBO process does allow them greater influence over the decision 
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making than has traditionally been their role in many communities. While it is reported to 
have had positive impact on institutional development, as in Rwanda, experience from 
Indonesia showed that women took part in actual decision making to a lesser extent than 
men do. Changing deep-rooted traditions and gender roles might take time and need to be 
carefully devised, not to be seen as imposed on the communities or exposing the women 
to an unacceptable degree. Encouraging establishment of separate women groups  that 
then receive management training, employment and training of female facilitators and 
ensuring that the government and the WB send female staff to the village to meet with the 
women might ensure a more rapid progress on such issues. 
101.  Requiring a national process. International experience indicates that an 
entrenched reconciliation process entails a range of elements that go beyond agreeing and 
working together on practical projects. To reconcile those previously opposed, 
communities need to find ways of addressing the violent past, including trials, truth-
telling, compensation for past injustice, or a combination of these and other measures. 
Such processes do, however, require attention at a national level, and might therefore, in 
themselves, be a cause of conflict, as powerful individuals and groups might obstruct 
them for fear of being taken to court or los ing influence. 
102. Reconciliation scaling-up is difficult. Thus for CDD it seems important to 
separate what impact the process might hold at different levels and generate an 
understanding of the length of time that might be required to achieve the expected 
changes. From the various material reviewed a range of examples emerges of trust-
building and reconciliation at the village and district level, with signs that the population 
has taken a firm stand and is raising its demands on local and central authorities. Less 
evidence is found of a scaling-up effect that might, at least in the shorter term, exert 
influence on national reconciliation processes. It might, furthermore, be questioned if the 
World Bank wish to get involved in such processes. Not least as in some conflict contexts 
such public processes might be met with resistance from the local and central government 
or even international actors. Eventually, using the CDD as a pronounced tool for 
reconciliation as part of a poverty eradication strategy might possibly force the WB to 
make a choice between supporting the government/administration or the CBOs.  
103. CDD is politically sensitive. The East Timor case introduces another element 
underlining the above point: namely how CBO formation and the intention to empower 
communities to engage directly with the national government (or the UN administration 
in this case) might be regarded as a political process rather than a simple humanitarian 
one. While this case might be special as the UN at that time was in the midd le of the 
election process, it still indicates that empowering people has a political dimension not 
always welcomed by those in power. The present strategy of the Afghan Transitional 
Authority of demanding secret ballot elections for the CBOs, to prepare the Afghans for 
elections for President and Parliament and to establish a governance structure at the 
village level, to bypass the present local government structure, are example of how CDD 
might be used for larger political purposes in a conflict context. 
Reconstruction and development 
104.   From the reports it emerges that there in this case are two possibly 
contradictory objectives. On the one hand there is an emphasis on the extensive 
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facilitation of CBO establishment while on the other hand there is an urge for immediate 
project initiation to enable people to see the benefits of the peace process. In the latter 
case, there is frequent use of the term ‘reconstruction’, limiting the developmental aspect 
of the process and possibly the project range.   
105. It takes time to organise. While there is a discussion under way in the WB on 
introducing Community Driven Reconstruction as a response to demands for more rapid 
project initiation, a number of CDD evaluations emphasise the importance of proper CBO 
formation as the single most important element in CDD success.14 A major challenge is 
the extent of facilitation and capacity development required for CBOs to not only 
prioritise projects, but be in a position to manage and report on these and in the end 
sustain the project investments. Although there might be a need for a more rapid project 
initiation in a conflict context, it might still be questioned whether speeding up the CBO 
decision-making process is a feasible solution or whether this is undermining the longer 
term and wider CDD objectives.    
106. Bypassing is not a lasting solution. A related issue is therefore the selection of 
the government structure(s) to involve in the CDD planning and implementation process. 
As noted from the project overviews there are large variations as to what ministry and/or 
department that is selected as CDD partner. The selection criterion seem, at least in some 
cases reviewed, to favour the entity that offers less bureaucratic resistance to the WB and 
not necessarily the one with the main formal responsibility for local level development 
efforts. Such strategies might certainly ease the implementation of CDD projects in the 
short term, but at the expense of building a more permanent CDD capacity within key 
ministries, coordination of the wider development efforts and, in the end, ensuring the 
government’s ownership of and responsibility for the CDD process.  
107. ‘Negative’ social capital may be reinforced. A stated intention of the CDD is 
the rebuilding and the strengthening of social capital, which is defined as ‘the ability of 
individuals to secure benefits as a result of membership in social networks’.  In conflict 
contexts in particular it might be difficult to differentiate between what constitutes or 
develops positive and negative social capital, not least given the strong influence of 
powerful individuals and the difficulty of excluding these from the CDD processes. Thus, 
if the communities and the CBO, in collaboration with the facilitators, do not define what 
type of positive social capital needs to be developed in that particular community, the 
underlying causes of the conflict might be left unaddressed and an unjust resource 
distribution maintained. That could then jeopardise the entire CDD process and generate 
new conflicts. 
108. Some element of couching is needed. The CDD concept rests on popular 
participation, civic engagement and a fully demand driven project selection process in 
which the poor can be empowered through the experience that their prioritisations are 
honoured and supported. What might be questioned, however, is how participant-oriented 
and demand driven the processes actually are, as the WB in cooperation with central 
government and implementing agency will have designed and guided the process in 
                                               
14 A review of the Indonesian KDP project (Edstrom, 2002, 2) states that ‘The essence of the programme, 
therefore, is establishing vital participatory processes, rather than delivering tangible physical evidence of the 
investment, although the latter remains important for assessing project success.’   
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different ways. From the start it is the implementing agency and the hired facilitators  that 
select  the communities to be invited and assisted to form the CBO, including a range of 
preconditions that have to be met as to how they are to be formed. They will furthermore 
be informed about what kind of projects will not receive financial support, and what 
requirements they need to fulfil to be entitled to support. In CEP and KDP the CBOs must 
forward their project proposals (of which one has to be for a project benefiting women) to 
the sub-district council, where a further selection process takes place. The feedback from 
the questionnaires underlines the fact that the initial CBO establishment is much less 
community- than design- driven, though WB staff is of the view that gradually 
throughout the process more authority and responsibility are placed with the CBOs. 
While a pick-and-choose or a top-down approach at initial stages might be unavoidable, if 
rapid project implementation is favoured, it at least limits the villagers’ opportunity to 
exercise power over the decision making process.  
109.  Good analysis of impact is lacking. Measuring and comparing the impact of 
development projects is always difficult, but more so for CDD projects, as there are 
multiple project goals and a range of implementation strategies is applied. In addition, the 
key term, community-driven development is not very well defined. While WB staffs, 
responding to the questionnaire, are of the opinion that CDD projects in conflict contexts 
have improved the living conditions of a large number of poor people, it has proven 
rather difficult to confirm this commonly held view. One reason is the relatively short 
time the CDD approach has been utilised in conflict contexts, leaving us with limited 
documentation as to whether this approach has been able to reduce the poverty level and 
rebuild social capital more permanently.  
Lessons about project design 
110. The timeframe is often too ambitious. Due to the complexities of the conflict 
context, weak government capacity, and a shortage of facilitators several reports point out 
that the implementation timetables of CDD projects have often been too ambitious. 
Delays may for instance be caused by renewed conflict that force the project proceeding 
on hold. While community capacities have tended to be higher than anticipated, it has 
been realised that the social and technical dimensions of the projects’ implementation 
require skilled facilitation and advice. Finding motivated and skilled local facilit ators 
turns out to be of utmost importance, but they are extremely difficult to identify in 
countries with a low education level and/or emerging from long-lasting conflicts that 
have eroded the education system – which is typical of many conflict contexts. 
111. Choosing between traditional and new CBOs- no simple answers. If trust 
among communities is weak and powerful individuals have gained a large influence, it 
emerges that CBOs have less scope for impartial and poverty-oriented project selection. 
An early indication from the Afghanistan programme is that CBOs might be taken over 
by local elites or commanders who might undermine the ability of existing village 
organisations to influence project prioritisation. As outlined in the review, different 
approaches have been utilised for CBO formation in different contexts: attempts have 
been made to offset the undue influence of traditional power holders or officials related to 
former power structures. It appears, however, that when these are excluded there is a risk 
of reducing the CBOs ability to forge collaboration within the villages or at least to hold 
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the authority to reconcile personal or communal differences. Yet, an advantage of 
establishing new CBOs is that they may have greater potential for including 
representatives of marginalised groups, and thus, in the longer term, ensure a higher 
degree of inclusion of the poorest and of women in the development processes. As a 
result it can be suggested that there is no clear answer as to what form of CBOs that 
might provide the best result. The reviews indicate that it would depend on (a) the 
specific context and whether there is a presence of powerful individuals wishing to take 
personal advantage of the funds or the CBOs; (b) the pre-existence of inclusive and 
representative community structures; and (c) the ability of the facilitators to form and 
develop representative CBOs able to resist undue pressure. 
112. Simplified project design and speedy financial disbursement is required. A 
general lesson is that project designs must be simplified and financial disbursement 
should be speedy. One specific challenge for community-level management in conflict 
contexts is the actual disbursement of funds and keeping of cash in the villages, as 
banking services either may not exist or may be unreliable and the security situation 
might remain unstable. The use of the traditional money transfer mechanisms, as the 
Hawala system that is trusted and used by the local population, might then be the only 
available solution until a proper and more transparent baking system comes in place.  
113. A broader and more holistic scope provide better results. A general 
argument, presented for the second phase of the Timor community empowerment 
programme, is that broader scope CDD programmes that include paying attention to 
cultural and local organisations are more successful than those that maintain a narrow 
engineering and technical design. Experience from the demobilisation of ex-combatant 
projects and those where the approach is narrowly targeted (such as for returnees) shows 
that such a selection process may become a source of conflict in itself. A CDD design 
with a more ‘holistic’ approach, targeting communities as a whole, might then include 
groups deemed to be specifically vulnerable in the overall project design without singling 
them out and prioritising them above other villagers. 
114. Avoid technically complex projects. It is generally mentioned that CDD may 
be inadequate for larger projects requiring a high degree of technical or specialized 
expertise for project design that might not be available in the country or region emerging 
from conflict. This could include expertise on reconstruction of large -scale irrigation 
systems, re-establishing higher education structures or larger health projects. The form of 
relationship that is established between local communities and governmental structures 
appears therefore to be important for the success of even the smaller projects. A gap or a 
lack of trust between community and government might seriously inhibit the ability or 
will to ask for or to provide CBOs with project advice, thus making the projects 
dependent on (expensive) external consultants.  
115. Corruption and representative distance. Corruption is acknowledged to be a 
major concern in most conflict contexts, in which a lack of transparency and openness on 
the use of funds are frequently cited as reasons for corruption to prevail.  An evaluation 
report from the PEACE project in Afghanistan remarks that there were signs in some of 
the villages of personal enrichment among the community representatives(Bernander 
2002). The report points out that having three executive  levels may have created a 
distance between the communities and their elected representatives, and thus impair ing 
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the community’s potential control with corruption. This indicates that a close connection 
between communities and representatives would work against corruption. On the other 
hand it has been argued, that ‘decentralised political systems are more corruptible, 
because the potential corrupter needs to influence only a segment of the government, and 
because in a fragmented system there are fewer centralised forces and agencies to enforce 
honesty’ (Andvig, 2001). The question that then remains unanswered is whether the CDD 
design is equipped with the necessary mechanisms to address this problem, or whether a 
decentralisation of power might in fact broaden the scope for practices of corruption. 
116. In either cases, internal monitoring by community members and various types of 
external monitoring, building of accountable and transparent institutional and communal 
ownership of resources might represent a safeguard against corruption. The Indonesian 
experience shows that the CDD projects had a multiplier effect in terms of villagers 
holding local government officials more accountable and demanding greater transparency 
within other government sponsored programmes.  
 
Lessons about implementation 
117. The strength of the CBOs is of outmost importance. Several sources notes 
that the impact of the CDD approach is directly related to the strengths of the CBOs 
driving the pr ocess. It is argued that the sustainability and effectiveness of CDD-
enhanced processes depends on simple and transparent procedures and on actors with 
strong and consistent incentives for good performance. However, we find few attempts at 
analysing what incentive systems are the most effective in fostering performance and 
accountability in CBOs, and how the general insecurity and weakened human resource 
base so frequently found in conflict contexts influence on these processes. 
118.  CDD less fit for situations with high inequality and instability. According to 
expert opinion, the CDD approach could make an uneasy fit with situations marked by 
high inequality, individualised power in warlords, landlords or strongmen, and by dangers 
of elite capture.15 In such contexts, the aims of community participation and of targeting 
the most vulnerable and marginalised groups are difficult to realise since funds and 
projects will tend to be absorbed by the most powerful local agents. CDD will become 
even more difficult to implement in areas where security remains below a minimum 
threshold, limiting the ability of facilitators and WB staff to keep regular contact with the 
CBOs, and where a financial delivery system is weak or does not exist.   
119. Micro-credit schemes have proved difficult to implement. Micro-credit 
projects appear not to have yielded the expected results, primarily due to a low repayment 
rate. An explanation provided is that since small-loan arrangements tend to benefit 
individuals more than collectives, it has proven difficult to reconcile the objectives of 
sustainable micro-finance and community empowerment. It is argued that while 
successful micro-finance depends on establishing a direct borrower-lender relationship 
and on rigorous adherence to clearly defined rules, community empowerment depends on 
                                               
15 This was remarked by several of the respondents on our questionnaire. 
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multi-stakeholder involvement and collective decision-making. What seems lacking in 
these reviews is an explicit discussion as if actually the most profitable project are 
selected. And, furthermore, if local communities do have the necessary time (especially 
the women) to allocate to such activities, if there might be better income opportunities in 
the black economy or if the population might be forced to either deliver some of their 
income to powerful individuals or to rather engage in activities that generate better 
income for these. 
120. The urban/rural divide. The majority of CDD projects are implemented in 
rural settings, which might cause additional implementation challenges in conflict 
contexts. While a conflict might have caused the same degree of destruction, migration 
and alienation towards government in the urban settings as in a rural one, there are some 
other important differences. It is a very strong likelihood that the majority of the educated 
population seeks towards the towns, that the banks and educational institutions are first 
established there and that security is given higher priority there than in remote rural areas, 
not least to protect the governmental institutions and international organisations. Thus, it 
might prove comparatively easy both to establish CBOs and to initiate and support urban 
based projects, whereas many city dwellers might be reluctant to work in the more remote 
areas, even expressing reservations , as frequently heard in Afghanistan, against working 
with ‘these uneducated people’. Such attitudes might generate tension between the rural 
and urban population if not properly addressed. 
121. Sustainability of projects is a major concern. Many project reports express 
concern about the longer-term sustainability of the projects, both due to a lack of 
coordination with other development actors as well as to governments’ inability to 
continue funding-initiated projects. Limited donor willingness to fund longer time 
development programmes in conflict contexts, meagre financial resources among the 
population and a lack of viable financial institutions from which individuals or CBOs 
might obtain credit or loans might exacerbate such difficulties. 
 
Issues for further discussion and research 
  
122. Our point of departure for this paper was that participatory and demand-led 
development approaches hold the potential to address three critical concerns in conflict 
contexts: 
The need for speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance.  
The need to improve the state -citizen relationship. 
The need to create alternative forms of community organisation that foster 
reconciliation between factions of the society. 
 
123.   Likewise, we identified a number of possible hindrances to development 
processes, including: security as a critical concern; a prevailing lack of trust between 
communities and towards governmental structures and officials; weakened or contested 
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governmental structures; erosion of social capital and a war economy operating in parallel 
to the legal financial system. 
124. Based on the theoretical introduction to the subject, the review of a selected 
number of CDD projects and WB lessons learned, and feedback from staff involved in 
conflict context CDD projects, we will here identify a number of issues we deem 
important for discussion and further research.  
 
The need for speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance 
125. A range of WB sources emphasise the need for a rapid implementation of CDD 
projects in conflict contexts. Not least because the population have needs that must be 
met more urgently in such situations, that they through benefiting from assistance can 
gain confidence in a peace process and a national government, start rebuilding their social 
capital and involve themselves in the wider rehabilitation processes. 
126. At the same time CBO formation in conflict contexts might need more time for 
facilitation and reconciliation than in most development contexts since communities may 
be divided and in need of building a degree of trust in external actors. Several reports 
emphasise the importance of a well thought out CBO formation process to ensure 
transparency, that the CBOs are sufficiently empowered to act on behalf of the 
communities, that the projects are sustained and that the process is not hijacked by 
powerful individuals. The discussion about the ideal composition of the CBOs highlights 
the difficulty of this process, as does the concern about the difficulties of finding 
competent facilitators. 
127. The ‘speed versus depth’ issue for a CDD process in a conflict context can be 
formulated in terms of the following questions:  
· In a conflict -ridden society, should it be the role of CDD to meet 
immediate local needs? Or should the focus remain on promoting long-
term community development through participatory processes? 
· If CDD projects provide assistance to meet the immediate needs  of the 
poorest segments of the population, how does that affect the trust building 
and empowerment of the community as a whole? 
· What  will be most important for a conflict affected community, to gain 
trust in their government and a peace process, rapid access to 
humanitarian assistance, or a real sense of holding influence over 
development processes?  
 
 The need to improve the state-citizen relationship 
128. It is acknowledged that the role of the national government is essential in the 
CDD process, both for successful project implementation and for sustaining the initial 
efforts. However, conflicts tend to increase tension between central and local government 
institutions and between the government and the citizens. Reconciling such opposing 
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forces thus seems essential, as does building the necessary understanding and 
commitment within the government and in the population at large. 
129. Given that governments establish different administrative structures and allow 
for varying degrees of local decision making, it is impossible to provide a blueprint for 
how the relationship with government institutions can be formalised in CDD. In addition, 
the presence of other humanitarian, political and even military actors needs to be taken 
into account when establishing and nurturing such relationships. Another challenge is for 
government entities to see community empowerment as a positive development and not a 
threat to their authority, and that there is a real acceptance of prioritising the poorest 
segments of the population. 
130. A prevailing war economy and a large degree of corruption are frequent 
characteristics of conflict contexts that might represent major obstacles to the CDD 
process. People might benefit more from continued involvement in illegal activities than 
from adapting to the CDD requirements, and there is a large possibility that both 
governmental entities and individuals alike will be reluctant to abandon illegal practices.  
131. There might be a shortage of skilled CDD personnel in local organisations and 
within governmental institution and much of their experience will be from more 
emergency oriented assistance schemes. This frequently has led to a practice of externally 
driven and more superficial decision making, where the idea that the communities should 
be allowed to gain control over their own development process has not been prominent. 
Change of a relief and ‘provision for’ attitude among the various CDD stakeholders might 
then be a lengthy process in conflict contexts. 
132. Questions to be asked under this heading are: 
·  Should the CDD process be restricted to develop local development 
capacities or also be a tool for the establishment of national governance 
structures? 
· When the capacity of governmental institutions is seriously impaired by 
violent conflict, how can CDD projects best be  designed to improve 
development knowledge and capacities within these institutions ? 
· How can the CDD process best be safeguarded against corruption and 
can micro-finance projects be developed as an alternative to continued 
reliance ob the illegal economy? 
· How should we best differentiate between positive and negative social 
capital and identify ways to promote the positive ones?  
 
The need to create alternative forms of community organisation that foster reconciliation 
between factions of the society  
133. It has been argued that the composition of the CBOs is of utmost importance for 
the communities’ ability to engage in reconciliation and wider empowerment processes 
aimed at generating social change and strengthening social capital, and that a lasting 
empowerment of the communities and project sustainability will depend on communities’ 
ability to establish representative, innovative and skilled CBOs, able to draw on resources 
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in their own communities, the government, the WB and among a range of other 
humanitarian actors. One major dilemma here is how to handle the presence of powerful 
individuals who might either be associated with past oppression or have expanded their 
influence during the conflict by holding military power or gaining control over what used 
to be community property or resources. Their influence over the CBOs or involvement in 
project selection processes might inhibit reconciliation and set project priorities that 
might not be for the common good. That stated, we have witnessed that traditional power 
holders might hold the key to peaceful conflict resolution in the communities and have 
the necessary authority to confront new ‘conflict entrepreneurs’, and thus be instrumental 
in enabling the internal community reconciliation process. By marginalising them in the 
CDD process the ability to use this process as a reconciliation tool might be reduced.  
134. Conflicts frequently lead to displacement and to large numbers of community 
members residing outside their traditional habitat. Their needs might then be rather 
different from those who have remained in the communities throughout the conflict, as 
well as their attitudes, habits and traditions might have changed during the period in exile. 
Thus, a way will need to be found that not only facilitates their return to the communities 
from where they fled but also secures them a degree of influence over the CDD 
prioritising process, as in the end this group might actually constitute the majority of the 
village/hamlet population. 
135. An open project menu is regarded as important for empowerment as the 
communities will see that their decisions are honoured by those that provide them with 
the assistance. Here, however, the WB appears to convey mixed signals. There is already 
a list of projects that the WB refrains from funding, and there are certain combinations of 
projects, according to WB experience, that have proven more beneficial in conflict 
contexts. How to balance these two positions and at the same time to allow the local 
communities to define their project priorities seem major challenges. 
 
 
136. The questions to be posed are then: 
· How can the CDD approach be adapted so that it may help (re)establish 
local conflict resolution mechanisms and national institutions ?  
· What CBO formation process might best ensure the influence of poor 
marginalised groups and identification of projects that might address the 
needs of groups victimised by wars without alienating the wider population? 
· In divided communities, do the establishment of representative councils and 
provision of finance alone ensure building of trust between conflicting 
parties? In practice, what factors influence the dynamics of council decision-
making? 
· Can a linkage be established between CBOs’ ability to freely select their 
projects and their feeling of empowerment?  
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 Annex I. Terms of Reference 
 
 
 
 Community-Driven Development in Conflict Contexts:  
Learning from Experience and Improving Approaches 
 
Consultant Terms of Reference  
Per January 2003 
 
 
Objective and main features of proposed activity  
 
The Community-driven development (CDD) anchor unit in the World Bank’s Environmental and 
Socially Sustainable Network (ESSD) has been allocated funds from the Norwegian Trust Fund to 
support a programme of work on CDD in conflict contexts. 
 
CDD is a development approach that gives control of decisions and resources to community groups, 
working in tandem with demand-responsive support organizations and service providers including 
elected local governments, the private sector, NGOs, and central government. It is a way to provide 
social and infrastructure services, to organize economic activity, to empower poor people, improve 
governance, and enhance security of the poorest. 
 
CDD approaches aim to provide communitie s and local governments with the capacity and resources to 
better address the challenges of their own development. In conflict and post-conflict contexts, these 
challenges are ever more acute. The principles of participation, social inclusion, social accountability 
and partnership can provide critical means for preventing conflict and be a vehicle for promotion of 
social cohesion and trust; hence, CDD approaches are increasingly being utilized to address the 
challenges in conflict and post-conflict environments. However, current knowledge of appropriate 
design mechanisms and methodologies and impact and sustainability of CDD investments in conflict 
settings is weak and there has been little by way of dissemination of good practice. 
 
The work will explore the twin objectives of: (i) detailing the specific challenges of designing and 
implementing CDD approaches in conflict or post-conflict environments and understanding how to 
better design operational components of CDD programs and projects, and; (ii) improving our 
knowledge of how CDD can contribute to reconciliation, reconstruction and development in a post-
conflict setting (rebuilding social capital, trust-building, participation and civic engagement, CBO-local 
government linkages, etc.). 
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The proposed work programme will involve a review of experience to date of the contribution and 
impact of CDD approaches in conflict environments as a first step in building knowledge of successful 
operational tools and institutional arrangements. The 3-year work programme will also include four 
regional practitioner exchange workshops (Africa, Central Asia and East Asia), preparation of case 
studies and training modules and the provision of technical assistance to CDD teams. 
 
This work is expected to benefit World Bank and other practitioners (government, civil society, private 
sector, donors) working in conflict areas to understand and improve upon approaches for community 
based and community-driven conflict prevention, resolution, mitigation and reconstruction. 
 
Specific Responsibilities for the Consultant 
 
This work programme requires a focused research agenda and analytical framework to guide the 
workshops, documentation and case studies, for which the consultant would be responsible. A critical 
requirement is an assessme nt of current practice including analysis and reporting on key lessons and 
information gaps. Tasks to be undertaken by the consultant would include: 
 
1. Preparation of a concept paper. Research and drafting of background paper based on desk 
review, web research and interviews with Bank staff and external specialists. This paper would 
(i) take stock of CDD approaches used in ‘conflict operations’ and assess their relevance and 
impact and main lessons learned; (ii) frame the overall agenda for the work programme  and, 
(iii) highlight the principal thematic areas for research. It would thus serve as the basis for 
discussion and guidance in the regional workshops. 
 
2. Support to regional workshop. The work proposes to draw lessons from empirical experience 
of CDD programmes on the ground by convening a series of workshops for practitioners and 
specialists in three regions (Africa, Central Asia and East Asia). In FY03, an initial workshop 
for Portuguese-speaking Africa is planned to take place in May in Maputo. This would draw 
together CDD teams (including representatives from government, civil society and World Bank 
staff and perhaps other donors) and CDD/conflict specialists from Angola, Mozambique and 
Guinea-Bissau. It is hoped that a team from East Timor would also participate in this 
Lusophone workshop. The workshop would be expected to catalyze local/regional networking 
amongst practitioners (supported by website development, distance learning and practitioner 
exchanges) and be structured to generate operationally-relevant material for dissemination and 
training purposes. The consultant would support the planning and delivery of this workshop 
(agenda, material development, etc.) 
 
3. Preparation of Technical Note . The consultant will be responsible for the production of a 
Technical Note by preparing a synthesis of proceedings of the workshop, summarizing the most 
relevant and substantial inputs from the participants and other outputs as deemed necessary (i.e. 
distance learning, website and training tools development). 
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Timing 
 
Date Deliverable  Consultant activities 
February-
April 2003 
· Concept paper 
 
· research and  prepare background paper through literature 
review, interviews, web research 
April-May 
2003 
· AFR Lusophone 
workshop 
· prepare background material, agenda and organization of 
workshop with local consultants 
May-June 
2003 
· Technical Note 
 
· Prepare workshop synthesis and dissemination note  
 
Coordination and Supervision 
 
Daniel Owen (SDV), Ian Bannon (SDV), Veronica Nyhan (WBI) and Jacomina de Regt (AFR) are co-
task managers. The consultant will report to Daniel Owen, coordinator of the CDD anchor group in 
ESSD.  
  54 
Annex II. Questionnaire 
 
Project: 
If you have been working on several projects within the field addressed here, please pick one of them. 
 
Position:  
 
1) How was the development of project design influenced by the conflict or post-conflict environment? 
What were the challenges? What factors became especially important to make the project a success? 
 
2) One crucial aspect, discerning CDD from other participatory approaches, is the stress on empowering 
individuals and community groups to drive the process from below. In your project, how, and according 
to what kind of criteria, was the community-based organizations (CBO) identified? Did you experience 
any problems in finding a suitable CBO, and if so, to which extent did you have to intervene to make 
one emerge? 
 
3) To what extent, in your view, did the CBOs 
a) Plan the project?  
b) Implement the project?  
c) Drive and further develop the project? 
d) Include vulnerable and excluded groups?  
 
4) What do you see as the most challenging aspect and phase of the project? 
 
5) In the project, what have so far been the main achievements? 
 
6) In your opinion, has the project contributed to promote 
a) Reconciliation in the community/ies concerned? If yes – in what ways? If no – why not?  
b) Reconstruction in the community/ies concerned?  If yes – in what ways? If no – why not?  
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7) In what kind of conflict or post-conflict situations do you imagine that CDD will not be a suitable 
approach?  
 
8) Please include any other comments you may have on these or related issues. 
 
Many thanks for your cooperation! 
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Annex III. Project Objectives and Scope 
Projects  Objectives Geographical scope/ 
number of beneficiaries 
Social Action 
Project  (I) Angola 
1)Improve access to basic services  
2) Improve the capacity of communities and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) in project management 
3) Generate additional income and employment  
4) Enhance the capacity of Angolan institutions to collect and analyze poverty-
related data; and provide a better understanding of the main causes of poverty  
 
In 9 provinces, 31 out of  
70 municipalities  
1, 012 mill beneficiaries 
Social Action 
Project (I) Burundi 
1) Encourage participation of poor individuals in small scale productive 
activities  
2) Improve living conditions through employment generation and better social 
services 
3) Foster participation of local governments and NGOs in development related 
activities 
4) Monitoring of poverty to improve governmental capacity to formulate and 
implement economic and social policies 
In 93 of 118 communes  
1.284 mill beneficiaries  
Community 
Empowerment and 
Local Governance 
Project (I) East 
Timor 
1) Increasing community participation in planning, implementation and 
maintenance of community’s assets and economic activities; 
2)Increasing business activity and income generation, expanding employment 
opportunities 
3)Providing infrastructure 
4) Increasing capacities of community institutions to facilitate the process of 
community empowerment.  
 
416 village development 
councils 
Kecamatan 
Development 
Project (I) 
Indonesia 
To reduce poverty and improve local level governance in Indonesia 986 sub-districts 
(kecamatan) in 22 of 
Indonesia’s 26 provinces, 
including, 25 million 
beneficiaries 
Community 
Reintegration and 
Development 
Project Rwanda 
 
To demonstrate that community reintegration and development can effectively 
take place through a process of government decentralization and community 
participation. 
12 communes  
 
National 
Community 
Empowerment 
Programme 
Afghanistan 
Recapitalize villages and neighbourhoods to enable them to return to normal level 
of economic activity  
 
Not available 
Kosovo 
Community 
Development Fund  
1) Support access and quality of community infrastructure and services in poor 
and war-affected communities, including minority communities 
2) Support local institutional capacity building at CDF, municipal and 
community level through the introduction and promotion of principles of public 
participation, sound resource management, client satisfaction with service 
delivery, cost recovery, transparency and accountability. 
Five regions in 30 
municipalities, 186 sup-
projects completed. 
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Projects  Objectives Geographical scope/ 
number of beneficiaries 
Promoting 
Transition from 
Conflict to Peace 
and Development 
at Community 
Level in Mindanao 
Philippines  
 
1) Make a difference in the lives of Filipinos displaced by armed conflict by 
working with the affected communities to develop enabling conditions that 
encourage safe return or settlement, facilitate the process of transition and 
stabilization, and provide a foundation for peace building and sustainable 
development. 
  
2) Contribute to the existing knowledge base by developing and testing 
models that will inform approaches to the transition from conflict to peace. 
 
28 villages, 33 500 
beneficiaries  
Self Reliance for 
IDPs and Host 
Families in 
Samagrelo region 
Georgia 
Improve living conditions of vulnerable IDPs and local population in rural areas 
in the Samagralo region in a sustainable way by enhancing their self-reliance, 
integration and community cohesion 
7 villages, 3000 families  
Building Local 
Institutions and 
Social Capital: the 
Tuzla Model 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1) To create private sector jobs, providing products and services to Tuzla’s local 
and regional markets  
2) Improve public infrastructure 
3) Stimulate local investment in public and private sector 
4) Build social capital: increase inter-personal trust and social cohesion, 
increase confidence in formal institutions, enhance civic values, enhance 
participation in and strengthen the relationships between Tuzla’s local 
government, business community, and local NGOs and citizen’s associations 
5) Build human capital: instil the values, skills and confidence of entrepreneurial 
leadership  
NA 
Southern Serbia 
Municipal 
Improvement and 
Recovery 
Programme Serbia 
To contribute to the consolidation of the consensus on peace in Southern Serbia 
thorugh municipal development, economic recovery and social rehabilitation 
6 municipalities 
Community 
Rehabilitation 
Project Burundi 
1)Rehabilitation of infrastructure 
2) Building local capacity to enhance the country’s ability to integrate returning 
refugees 
16 sub-projects carried 
through 
The P.E.A.C.E 
Programme 
Afghanistan 
Food security, social services, and livelihood opportunities. Special attention to 
women’s rights, providing assistance to the poorest and marginalised groups, 
attention to ongoing environmental degradation and sustainability of the 
programmes  
 
26 rural districts, 6 urban 
areas, 2100 CBOs, 
farmers groups and 
cooperative associations   
Health Service 
Recovery Project 
Somalia 
To develop a strategy, systems and tools to transform  community health 
centres into a sustainable service that would form part of the future health 
sector in Somalia 
49 communities 
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Annex IV: Organisations and Persons Contacted 
   Organisations 
contacted Contact persons Projects/Units 
Date of 
first 
inquiry 
1 The World Bank Dan Owen, Senior Social 
Development  
Specialist 
Social Action Project Angola  
 
8.May 
2003 
2 The World Bank 
Susan Wong EASES M&E 
consultant 
Kecamatan Development Project 
 
8.May 
2003 
3 The World Bank Menahem Prywes, Task team 
leader 
Second Social Action Project, Burundi 
 
9. May 
2003 
4 The World Bank Scott Guggenheim, former Task 
team leader  
 
 
 
Community Empowerment Project, East Timor 
Kecamatan Development Project 
Support for Conflict Affected Areas Project 
Afghanistan National Solidarity Project 
8.May 
2003 
5 The World Bank Colin Scott, Manager  
 
Post Conflict Fund 
 
8.May 
2003 
6 The World Bank Wim Alberts, Task team leader 
 
Social Action Project Angola + 
CDD Project in Eritrea 
8.May 
2003 
7 The World Bank 
Norbert Mugwagwa, Task team 
leader Northern Uganda Social Action Fund  
8.May 
2003 
8 The World Bank 
Gillian M. Brown, Former Task 
team leader East Timor Community Empowerment II 
8.May 
2003 
9 The World Bank 
Patrice Dufour, Task team leader 
Knitting together nations Bosnia  
 
8.May 
2003 
10 The World Bank 
Sean Bradley, Social Protection 
Specialist  
CDD projects in Sierra Lione  
 
8.May 
2003 
11 The Soros 
Foundation/ 
The World Bank 
Caroline Mascarell, Task team 
leader 
 
 
Kosovo Fund for Community Development 
Fund 
 
 
9.May 
2003 
12 The World Bank 
Markus Kostner, Former Task 
team leader 
Rwanda Reintegration and Development 
Project 
8.May 
2003 
13 Counterpart 
International 
Arlene Lear, Senior VP 
 Empowering women: Socioeconomic 
Development in Post-Conflict Tajikistan 
8.May 
2003 
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17 Community and 
Family Service 
International 
(CFSI) 
Steven Muncy, Executive 
Director 
Celia Santos, Mindanao Project 
Coordinator 
Promoting Transition from Conflict to Peace 
and Development at the community level, 
Mindanao, Philippines 
 
9. May 
2003 
18 IFRC Sean Deely, Project manager 
 
Health Sector Rehabilitation (Somalia) 
 
9. May 
2003 
19 UNDP Knut Østby, Deputy Resident 
Representative UNDP, Kabul 
 
P.E.A.C.E project, Afghanistan 
 
 
26.May 
2003 
20 International 
Organization for 
Migration 
(Bogota) 
International Organization for 
Migration 
 
 
Protection of Patrimonial assets of Colombia’s 
Internally Displaced Population 
 
 
9.May 
2003 
21 Friends of Bosnia Chris Bragdon, Director of 
Bosnia Projects 
 
 
Strengthening Local Level Institutions and 
Building of Social Capital in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: The Tuzla Model 
 
8.May 
2003 
22 National 
Development 
Planning Agency, 
Government of 
Indonesia 
(BAPPENAS) 
BAPPENAS Support for Conflict Ridden Areas 9.May 
2003 
23 Afghan 
Transitional 
Authority, 
Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and 
Development  
Mohammed Ehsan Zia, Project 
Administrator 
National Solidarity Program 10.June 
2003 
 
 
14 The World Bank Alexandr Marc  
Steven Holztman, Task 
manager 
Municipal Improvement and Recovery 
Program in Southern Serbia 
9.May 
2003 
15 Accion contra el 
Hambre Julia Kharashivili, Project 
coordinator Self Reliance Fund for IDPs in Georgia 
9.May 
2003 
16 The World Bank 
Pamphile Kantabaze, Task 
team leader Community Rehabilitation Project in Burundi 
9.May 
2003 
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Summary 
 
Violent conflict represents not only a significant barrie r to 
development; it also wipes out efforts to improve the situation. 
Experience from many developing countries has shown that 
Community Driven Development (CDD) programmes have 
been particularly effective in establishing or expanding 
essential social services and physical infrastructure at the local 
level. However, using CDD approaches in a conflict context as 
a means in post-war rehabilitation represents new challenges. 
When carried out in contexts of past or persistent conflict, 
CDD projects are confronted with some major challenges: 
· communities where projects are set may be deeply 
divided;  
· power is unequally distributed; 
· lines between combatants and civilians may be 
blurred; 
· a need to address past traumas may give rise to calls 
for inquiries or trials; and 
· economic recovery and basic services may be urgently 
needed.  
Nonetheless, the point of departure in this paper commissioned 
by the CDD unit of the Environmentally and Socially 
Sustainable Development (ESSD) Network of the World Bank, 
is that participatory and demand-led development approaches 
might potentially address three critical concerns in conflict 
contexts: 
· The need for speedy and cost-effective delivery of 
reconstruction assistance. 
· The need to improve the state-citizen relationship. 
· The need to create alternative forms of community 
organisation that foster reconciliation between 
factions of the society. 
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